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ABSTRACT 
This paper explores characteristics of Norwegian ASA board networks from 2000 to 
2010, to better understand the consequences of new regulations in gender equality 
introduced in the period, and the financial crisis unfolding in the period. These 
latter exogenous shocks are bound to give repercussions that change the board 
structures, and hence inter-firm relations over time. During the period, the number 
of ASA firms was roughly halved. The evidence shows that, in spite of this, 2/3 of all 
ASA firms are connected through common directors. Additionally, I find that the 
networks change over time in terms of how firms connect through shared 
directorship. By 2010, there is an elite of directors, both male and female, occupying 
powerful positions in the network in terms of accessing information. 
 
 
2 
 
SAMMENDRAG 
Denne oppgaven undersøker hva som karakteriserer norske ASA-selskapers 
nettverk i perioden fra 2000 til 2010. Analysen bidrar med å gi innsikt i hvilke 
konsekvenser kjønnskvoteringsloven og finanskrisen har hatt for selskapers 
nettverk. Kjønnskvoteringsloven og finanskrisen er to eksogene sjokk som har 
endret styresammensetningen og i så måte endret forholdene bedrifter har til 
hverandre. Jeg finner at 2/3 av alle ASA-selskaper er forbundet gjennom at de deler 
ett eller flere styremedlemmer med andre selskaper. Videre finner jeg at nettverket 
endrer seg over tid hvis man ser på hvilken selskaper som er forbundet på grunn av 
delte styremedlemmer. I tillegg finnes det en elite av styremedlemmer, både 
kvinner og menn, som har sentrale posisjoner i nettverket. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
This paper studies Norwegian Allmennaksjeselskap (hereafter referred to as ASA1) 
inter-firm network by shared directors from 2000 to 2010. Norway is the first country 
in the world legislating a gender law, requiring 40% gender representation on the 
board of directors, hence placing Norway in the forefront on gender equality in the 
boardroom. This law acts as a natural experiment for other countries to look at when 
debating equality in the business world. In 2008 when the financial crisis struck, many 
companies were forced to make changes (some rendered bankrupt). These changes 
probably reached the boardrooms as well. The new gender balance law and the 
unfolding financial crisis, act as two exogenous shocks for the board environment. 
Gender representation, as stated in the proposition no.97 of 2002-2003 (Regeringen 
2002), is considered important to the contribution of gender equality, wider power 
distribution and utilisation of existing knowledge and resources in society as a whole. A 
study conducted by Adams and Ferreira (2009) on companies in USA, show that gender-
diverse boards allocate more effort to monitoring. Staubo (2010) finds that the increase 
in female directors due to the gender law have left boards being more independent than 
before. However, Seierstad and Opsahl (2011) conclude that the private sector is not 
convinced by the arguments in the proposition since the female ratio has not increased 
beyond 40 percent nor has the female fraction of chair positions increased. The gender 
law has resulted in a need for reshuffling of the directorship network to meet the 
legislation. However, to this point, one does not know what effect this reshuffling has 
had to the directorship network. 
Other studies related to governance structures have found multiple directorships to be 
preferred for both firm performance (Bøhren and Strøm, 2010) and acquisition of 
information (Grønmo and Løyning, 2003). Director independence is considered 
essential in conducting sufficient monitoring and in being an advisory body to the 
executive management, particularly the CEO. Indeed, multiple directors must be 
balanced against representing multiple interests when serving as board members for 
different firms.  
                                                        
1 similar to public limited companies 
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This study will add to the literature by describing, visualising and characterising the 
inter-firm board of directors’ networks in an environment dominated by 1) mandatory 
and soft laws influencing established best practice in terms of board structure and 2) 
the financial crisis immediate ripple effect to board structure and inter-firm 
connections. This network study primarily focuses on how firms are connected through 
common directors and not individual member characteristics in the network.  
Utilizing social network analysis as a methodical angle is a fairly recent approach when 
looking at and understanding how multiple directorships produce connections and 
spread information between firms. Keep in mind, however, that the formal ties between 
board of directors is not the only way information is shared with a company, informal 
ties is also an important information “highway”. The same can be seen for formal ties 
outside of ASA boards, e.g. AS boards. However, this study is limited to formal ties by 
ASA board directorship. Network analysis is conducted partly by extracting centrality 
measurements, more specifically, the so-called degree, closeness, betweenness and 
eigenvector (see chapter 4.2.1.4). 
I find that there is an inter-firm network of ASA firms connecting 2/3 of all firms 
throughout the period. A few male, and as the decade progresses, an almost comparable 
number of female directors, hold prominent positions in this network. If anything the 
“boys’ club” has been joined by the “golden skirts”. The average age of directors has 
increased, however the average age for female directors is five years younger than their 
male peers by 2010. Firms that have stayed in the database during the eleven year 
period have higher centrality scores compared to other firms at the end of the period. 
These firms, however, do not stick together as one might expect, but are spread 
throughout the network.  
The thesis proceeds as follows: a brief overview of available literature on the subject in 
chapter 2. Then, chapter 3 presents the institutional background and hypothesis before 
chapter 4 provides information about methodology followed by chapter 5 presenting 
the data and its characteristics. Results of the analysis can be found in chapter 6 and a 
additional evidence is presented in chapter 7. Finally, results and conclusions are 
presented in chapter 8. 
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1.1 NETWORK STUDY 
Social networks can take many forms and may be studied for different purposes. Figure 
1 shows two different random networks and gives the reader an idea of what a network 
can look like. The figure to the left is a one-mode network where circles can represent 
people, organizations etc. and the lines shows the connections between them. The figure 
to the right is a two-mode network where the circles represent two types of categories. 
For example, black circles can be boards (event) and white circles represent directors 
(actor), and this is known as an affiliation network. Based on network relations 
information flow etc. within the network can be studied. 
 
FIGURE 1 - RANDOM NETWORK SAMPLE FOR ILLUSTRATION PURPOSES. 
RIGHT FIGURE: ONE-MODE NETWORK AND LEFT FIGURE: TWO-MODE NETWORK. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW 
The Gender Balance Law (GBL ) came as an exogenous shock in 2006 and is 
consequently a natural experiment situation on what was already established to be the 
best practice for firms (Ahern and Dittmar, 2010).  
Bøhren and Staubo (2014) find that, compared to other more flexible alternatives, the 
mandatory approach to gender balance is a costly way to regulate firm boards. Many 
firms choose to exit ASA as their organizational form to avoid the legislation in general. 
One repercussion of choosing AS over ASA is less transparency, hence less information 
is shared. Bøhren and Staubo also find that the exiting firms are commonly 
characterised as being small, young, successful companies, not family owned, with few 
female directors or strong owners. 
Ahern and Dittmar (2010) find that the GBL has a negative impact on firm value based 
on the idea that the board is selected to maximize value. However, they find that firm 
value did not decline due to the new members, but rather due to young age and lack of 
high-level work experience. On average, all firms had to change 30 percent of their 
board of directors to meet the requirements. This led to a change in board 
characteristics including age, gender and experience. Hence, GBL led to less optimal 
boards, which in turn gave weaker firm performance. Ahern and Dittmar (2010) also 
find that a) board members with previous CEO experience or professional board 
members increase firm value and b) older board members increase value. The cost of 
this forced legislation is borne by the firm’s shareholders. 
Bøhren and Strøm (2010) find that boards have higher firm value creation when gender 
diversity is low. They have evidence to suggest that the absence of employee directors is 
favourable to firm value. The authors additionally find that directors with strong links 
to other boards create more value for its owners and that multiple directorships are 
beneficial for value creation. Utilizing information centrality, they find that the value of 
the firm is higher when directors have wide networks through board memberships in 
other firms. 
Seierstad and Opsahl (2011) address the effects of gender balance law as an exogenous 
shock with collected data of ASA-firms from 2002 to 2009. Applying betweenness 
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centrality, they reject a hypothesis on equality between gender and conclude that the 
influence has, after the law was fully effective, been concentrated on a few individual 
directors. Advocates of the gender balance law have claimed that the law would lead to 
a more desirable equality distribution. However, Seierstad & Opsahl (2011) report that 
the opposite is in fact the case. Additionally, the authors conclude that the private sector 
is not convinced by the argument behind the law since the female ratio of directorships 
has not increased beyond the mandatory 40 percent nor has the fraction of female 
holding chair positions increased. 
Grønmo and Løyning (2003) conduct a qualitative longitudinal study of Norwegian 
boards and report that holding multiple directorship2 is considered to be a valuable way 
of acquiring and sharing knowledge and experience. Moreover, they argue that these 
directors have more influence than their non-multiple director colleagues. A respondent 
stated that as CEO one should hold board membership outside ones firm to “get new 
impulses”. The majority of respondents recognise that network has become increasingly 
important to conduct successful business in a rapidly changing environment. The study 
is in line with what social network analyses seek to show.  
Conyon and Muldoon (2006) is a network-study utilizing data from USA, UK and 
German boards to investigate whether boards are more “clubby” than what would be 
expected purely by random graph modelling. They find that this is not the case and that 
board networks in the corporate world are no more “pronounced” than what one would 
expect by chance. In addition, they find evidence to suggest that directors who sit on 
several boards appear to do so in the company of others who also sit on several boards3.  
Granovetter (1973) is a seminal paper within the study of networks introducing the 
term “the strength of weak ties”. The paper is concerned with how information spreads 
throughout a network and asserts that the weak ties are as equally important as the 
strong ties. Weak ties can work as bridges between groups of people who otherwise 
would be disconnected. There is a subtle point made by Granovetter: strong ties 
between mutual friends can be broken almost without consequence for information 
                                                        
2 Grønmo & Løyning (2003) refer to such directors as prominent directors. 
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flow within the friends’ network. Bridges are almost always formed from weak links - 
thus weak links may be of higher importance than strong links because they act as the 
crucial information ties that stitch subgroups in the social network together. An 
additional point is that weak ties do not only connect to another person, but to another 
group of people. 
A key point as to why weak ties are more fertile is that information will spread 
throughout larger number of people and always to someone new. In the case where one 
only shares information with strong ties, chances are the information will come back 
around, hence loop, and then stop. In the case of the board and firm networks this is an 
interesting observation which will be looked further into later by focusing on 
betweenness centrality, clustering and other centrality measures. 
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3 THEORY AND HYPOTHESES 
Focusing on relationships between firms, connected by shared directors, the underlying 
assumption is that common directors amongst boards are an important factor in the 
information flow between corporations. Thus, an analysis of the network created and 
maintained between boards as a function of shared membership should shed light on 
inter-firm board community formation. This again should be of importance to the 
understanding of the context for the work done by the boards of directors in corporate 
governance processes. 
In Norway, there is an ongoing debate on whether directorship networks are dominated 
by an elite of people whom all are connected. These elites, the argument goes, have 
mostly been male dominated, referred to as the “boys club” 4, before the gender balance 
law, however now supplemented by a league female director referred to as “golden 
skirts” post enforcement (Seierstad and Opsahl, 2006). Based on this, it is not 
unthinkable that the firm network consists of one large cluster/component where all 
firms are connected. Multiple directorship is considered an important success factor for 
value creation (Grønmo and Løyning, 2006; Bøhren and Strøm, 2010). This leads to the 
first hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1. The majority of ASA firms are connected on board level by multiple 
representations in directorship and CEO relations. 
Social Network Analysis is applied to explore the ASA networks in the period 2000 to 
2010. This period is characterised by two exogenous shocks transforming the context 
for ASA board; GBL and the financial crises of 2008. Over the sample period there is a 
44% decrease in number of ASA firms. Consequently, one might expect that the network 
will have changed over the decade. With this in mind, hypothesis two is: 
Hypothesis 2. The massive reduction of ASA firms has led to significant changes in 
the inter-firm network structure. 
                                                        
4 See 3.2.1 for description.  
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Corporate governance5 involves, according to OECD principles of corporate governance:  
 “... a set of relationships between a company’s management, it’s board, it’s 
shareholders and other stakeholders. Corporate governance also provides the 
structure through which the objectives of the company are set, and the means of 
attaining those objectives and monitoring performance are determined.” OECD 
(2004, p.14) 
Goergen (2012) underlines that: 
“The board of directors is the ultimate governing body within the corporation. It’s 
role, and in particular the role of non-executive directors on the board, is to look 
after the interests of all the shareholders as well as sometimes those of other 
stakeholders ...” 
Limited literature on inter-firm network by shared directors including social network 
analysis and visualisation seem to exist. Some Norwegian studies address the effects of 
the “gender bender” regulation enforced in the period studied here. Seierstad and 
Opsahl (2010) apply social network analysis to study the effect of women entering the 
boards in the period May 2002 to August 2009 and conclude that the “gender bender” 
regulation has “created a small elite of female directors”. Hypothesis 3 is: 
Hypothesis 3. The effect of the major recruitment of female board members has 
caused a pool of female directorships with a privileged position in 
information flow between firm boards, forming clusters. 
This study will add to the literature by describing and visualising the inter-firm board of 
directors networks by social network analysis. It will also reveal some central 
characteristics of these networks. The specific causes driving the transformation of the 
networks throughout the decade is not the topic for this study, beyond recording the 
immediate effects of the major exogenous shocks represented by the GBL and the 
financial crises. 
                                                        
5Alternative definition by Shleifer and Vishny (1997) is less concerned with the stakeholders: “the way in 
which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment” 
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Following is a review of regulations concerning directorship and theory on social 
network analysis. 
3.1 ALLMENNAKSJESELSKAP (ASA) AND AKSJESELSKAP (AS) 
Two types of regulative arrangements give firms limited liability, namely Aksjeselskap  
and Allmennaksjeselskap, roughly private limited firm and public limited firm. The 
latter form was introduced in 1996 as a response to the European Union legislation 
regarding corporate law. The owner(s) of a firm can choose ad lib to be organised as 
ASA or AS, but the two are subservient to different regulations. 
Among the characteristics that separate the two, the number of shareholders as well as 
shareholder protection is highlighted. An ASA is generally more diffusely owned, as ASA 
is the only institutionalization of a firm that can obtain equity through the general 
public and be listed on the stock exchange. Because of this, ASA have more 
comprehensive provisions for reporting and transparency than AS. In general ASA firms 
have more transparency requirements than AS. 
Additional regulations for an ASA is a minimum of 1 million NOK in equity of which 
maximum 50 % can be shares without the right to vote or other types of limitations 
compared to common stocks. It is mandatory to conduct an annual general meeting.  
The gender quota law of 2006 only applies to ASA firms. The board of directors must 
consist of a minimum of three members in which both genders must be represented. In 
Norway the CEO cannot be a member of the board of directors within the same firm. All 
stocks must be registered in The Norwegian Central Securities Depository 
(Verdipapirsentralen, 2014). 
3.2 REGULATION AFFECTING ASA 
Most nations, including Norway, have regulations to secure that both shareholders and 
stakeholders are included in a firm’s corporate governance structure. Since 2006, the 
regulations include mandatory gender balance. In addition to mandatory legislations, 
firms are also advised to embrace the Norwegian recommendation for code of conduct 
(The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance - NCGB). The Norwegian 
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code of conduct is based on the publication of “Cadbury committee” (1992) report, 
OECD (2004) and Sarbanes-Oxley Act (2002). In the following section, a review of 
mandatory and code of conduct focussing on issues relating to board of directors. 
3.2.1 MANDATORY LEGISLATIONS 
The gender balance law became effective in 2006, with an acclimatisation period of two 
years for existing firms making it mandatory for all by 2008. 
In February 2002, the conservative party Minister of Trade and Industry, Ansgar 
Gabrielsen, announced through the media that he wanted a change in the Norwegian 
board of directors network. He claimed to be “sick and tired of the boys club” (VG nett 
2014) and urged all Norwegian firms, both AS and ASA, to execute a more gender equal 
policy when electing their board of directors. Gabrielsen also stated that he was willing 
to legislate a new bill to see this through if firms did not act on the encouragement 
voluntarily. 
This is how Norway came to be the first country to have a law demanding gender 
balance in the boardroom. Gabrielsen and the government based this decision on 
arguments that a gender quota requirement would contribute to a wider gender 
equality in society as a whole. Additionally, it would contribute to a positive 
decentralisation of power and a recruitment of new competence into the world of ASA 
boards. Successors within the government supported Gabrielsen’s statements further 
adding that it will contribute to more democracy and even enhanced value creation for 
companies. This paper will not discuss the political side of this law, but look at how this 
contributed to the development of inter-firm relations through the eyes of social 
network analysis. 
Proposition no.97 2002-2003 is the formal announcement of GBL that was set into 
motion January 1st  2006. ASA firms registered before 2006 had two years transition 
period and thus the legislation was mandatory for all ASA by 2008. The gender balance 
was not at 40%, for women, until 2008 and nor has it increased after. 
The proposition states that AS not will be affected by the law because Norwegian AS 
often are small, family-owned firms. In addition to ASA firms, the gender balance policy 
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also applies to state-owned firms, specifically: statsaksjeselskap (public sector 
corporation), statsallmennaksjeselskap (public limited liability state-owned company) 
and statsforetak (state corporation). 
Norwegian public limited liability companies act (Lov om Allmennaksjeselskaper - LOV-
1997-06-13-45. Lovdata, 2014) states that if the firm has three board members, both 
genders must be represented. If the firm has four or five board members, the board is 
required to have at least two representatives of each gender and so on. Table 1 shows 
the required gender representation. 
Board members Gender representation 
3 1 
4-5 2 
6-8 3 
9 4 
>9 40% 
TABLE 1 - REQUIRED GENDER REPRESENTATION ACCORDING TO BOARD SIZE. 
GBL has a direct effect on the board and enforce firms to assess what is considered the 
appropriate size of the board for the firm. Either the firm can choose to replace existing 
directors or they can increase board size to keep their directors. Therefore, I expect a 
change in board size over the sample period which leads to the next hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 4. The effect of the major recruitment of female board members has 
partly been absorbed by increasing the size of boards. 
3.2.2 CODE OF CONDUCT 
The Norwegian Code of Practice for Corporate Governance (2013) - is issued yearly by 
Norwegian Corporate Governance Board (in Norwegian “Norsk utvalg for eierstyring og 
selskapsledelse - NUES” 6). The purpose is to review guidelines and code of conduct for 
                                                        
6A cooperation of organizations publish the code: Aksjonærforeningen i Norge, Den norske 
Revisorforening (The Norwegian Institute of Public Accountants), Eierforum, Finans Norge (Finance 
Norway), Norske finansanalytikeres Forening (The Norwegian society for finance analysts), Næringslivets 
Hovedorganisasjon (Confederation of Norwegian Enterprise), Oslo Børs (Oslo Stock Exchange), 
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Norwegian firms relating to corporate governance. NCGB is not law, but a “comply or 
explain” type of guide on 15 aspects relating to governance structure - ref. NGCB (2013, 
p.13) often called “soft law”. 
Referring to the Public Companies Act and repeatedly highlighted in NCGB, the duties of 
the board of directors are pivotal: 
“The Public Companies Act stipulates that the board of directors has the ultimate 
responsibility for the management at the company and for supervising its day-to-
day management and activities in general” (NCGB, 2013, p.37). 
The function of the board according to the code of NCGB are extensive. It includes e.g. 
ensuring that the company implements sound corporate governance, defining the 
company’s basic corporate values and formulating ethical guidelines and guidelines for 
corporate social responsibility. It also includes the responsibility to make strategic 
decisions within the overall scope of the company’s business as defined by its owners, 
establish a clear and predictable dividend policy and decide on the company’s share 
capital. 
Independence is a highly regarded value in NGCB. Operationalization of independence 
of board members is widely discussed in the OECD principles of corporate governance. 
It also shows that practice and interpretation of independence vary across countries. In 
the final deliberations of the report, OECD underlines the value of independence in 
board structures: 
“Independent board members can contribute significantly to the decision-making 
of the board. They can bring an objective view to the evaluation of the performance 
of the board and management. In addition, they can play an important role in 
areas where the interests of management, the company and its shareholders may 
diverge such as executive remuneration, succession planning, changes of corporate 
control, take-over defences, large acquisitions and the audit function. In order for 
them to play this key role, it is desirable that boards declare who they consider to 
                                                        
Pensjonskasseforeningen (The Norwegian Association of Pension Funds) and Verdipapirfondenes 
Forening (Norwegian Fund and Asset Management Association). 
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be independent and the criterion for this judgement”. (OECD, 2004, p.64f) 
Independence is considered vital, to management board, shareholders and auditors. The 
independence of the board of directors is underlined repeatedly in NCGB, e.g. 
“The composition of the board of directors should ensure that it can operate 
independently of any special interests” (NCGB, 2013, p.31). 
“The company should operate guidelines to ensure that members of the board of 
directors and executive personnel notify the board if they have any material direct 
or indirect interest in any transaction entered into by the company” (NGCB, 2013, 
p.18). 
Relating to the main topic of this thesis, Social Network Analysis is about dependencies 
in inter-firm relations where board members are bridges or potential brokers between 
firms. This though, is not without complications and to some extent may be in conflict 
with the code. 
Independence in the NCGB code is mostly defined in relation to the executive 
management and “material business contact”, as well as “independent of the company’s 
main shareholder(s)” (NGCB, 2013, p.18). Independence is difficult to define, as can be 
seen from this extensive quote: 
“In general terms, a member of the board of directors may be defined as 
independent when the individual in question has no business, family or other 
relationships that might be assumed to affect his or her views and decisions. It is 
difficult to provide an exhaustive summary of all the matters that might affect the 
independence of a member of the board. When evaluating whether a member of the 
board is independent of the company’s executive management or its main business 
connections, attention should be paid to ensuring, inter alia, that the individual: 
● has not been employed by the company (or group where appropriate) in a 
senior position at any time in the last five years 
● does not receive any remuneration from the company other than the 
regular fee as a board member (does not apply to payments from a 
company pension) 
● does not have, or represent, business relationships with the company  
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● is not entitled to any fees as a board member that are dependent on the 
company’s performance or to any share options  
● does not have any cross-relationships with executive personnel, other 
members of the board of directors or other shareholder elected 
representatives  
● has not at any time in the last three years been a partner or employee of the 
accounting firm that currently audits the company. 
The criteria listed above may also be relevant to determining whether a member of 
the board of directors is independent of the company’s main shareholder(s). Such 
evaluation should then be carried out on the basis of the board member’s 
relationship with the main shareholder(s) not the company. The rationale for 
placing such emphasis on the independence of the board of directors is to ensure 
that the interests of shareholders in general are properly represented” (NCGB, 
2013, p.33). 
The influence of social networks as a factor of independence is not directly included or 
addressed in the NCGB (2013) code, nor in the OECD (2004) report. However, the 
importance of social networks in board performance and functions is addressed in 
research. In their article Carpenter and Westphal (2001) examine how external network 
ties determine a board's ability to contribute to the strategic decision making process. 
They conclude that the strategic context of social network ties, not simply the number of 
ties, is an important influence on corporate governance. 
Inter-firm ties by board members may be ties between firms within the same industry 
or across industries. Westphal, Seidel, and Stewart (2001) find that “firms that have 
board network ties to firms in other industries that imitate their competitors' business 
strategy are likely to imitate their own competitors' business strategy, as well as their 
competitors' acquisition activity and compensation policy”. This indicates that 
information shared through a tie in the firm board, their directors, could indeed lead to 
competitors having valuable insight into a given firm. Hence, a firm should be concerned 
with and be strategic regarding their common directors, both to protect and acquire 
valuable information.   
Westpahal et. al (2001) shows that information flows through inter-firm networks by 
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board members represented on several boards. They also show that the information in 
question may be of importance in a firm's strategic decisions. It does not show that the 
highly regarded independence is compromised. However, given the potential function of 
the information flow, the ties in question here have a potential to compromise 
independence. The potential is of more interest than e.g. simple friendship ties or even 
family ties, as inter-firm representation by board members implies that he or she has 
“two hats”, while this is not the case in simple friendship ties.  
Based on this discussion on independence and the literature review there are reasons to 
assert that present regulations are insufficiently concerned with networking7. And it is 
even the case that the ones that are ref. The Norwegian Code of Practice of Corporate 
Governance 8 seem to disfavour networking. 
An additional initiative of securing independence is by honouring the tenure 
recommendations. Directorship tenure is recommended by NCGB as follow: 
“While the legislation permits a term of office for members of the board of directors 
of up to four years, this Code of Practice recommends that the term of office should 
not exceed two years. The situation in respect of both the company’s requirements 
and the demands of independence can change over the course of a two-year period 
….. Recruitment of members of the board should be phased so that the entire board 
is not replaced at the same time.” 
Tenure recommendations combined with the possibility that firms must replace male 
with female directors could lead to a change in board members age towards being 
younger as the “old boys club” becomes smaller. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5. The effect of the major recruitment of female board members has 
caused a pool of board members lowering the average age. 
                                                        
7 Networking: “Creating a group of acquaintances and associates and keeping it active through 
regular communication for mutual benefit”, based on a givers mentality. See Businessdictionary.com 
8 Read more about this in chapter Theory, page 10. 
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In addition to hypothesis 1-5 this study will look into how firms that are present in 
all eleven years in the dataset, referred to as survivors, are positioned in the network. 
The following two hypotheses will be considered: 
Hypothesis 6. Survivors tend to have a more privileged information position in the 
inter-firm network.  
Hypothesis 7. Survivors tend to be more connected to other surviving firms than 
other firms. 
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4 METHODOLOGY 
This chapter gives an introduction to applied concepts and terminology from social 
network analysis (SNA). 
Social network analysis has emerged as an interdisciplinary research field. The 
theoretical foundation is a merger of social theory and application, mathematical, 
statistical and computing methodology (Wasserman and Faust, 1994 p.10). Social 
network analysis has emerged as a powerful methodological tool alongside statistics 
and focuses on ties, e.g. people, groups of people and organizations. The main goal of 
social network analysis is detecting and interpreting patterns of social ties among actors 
(Nooy, Mrvar, and Batagelj, 2011).  
The branch of mathematics called graph theory is applied to define the concepts used. A 
graph is a set of vertices or nodes and a set of lines, or edges, between pairs of vertices. 
A network consists of a graph and information on the edges or vertices.  A network is a 
map of the relationships (ties or edges) between a set of objects (nodes or vertices) 
(Kadushin 2012, p.14). There are more ways of naming the same networks due to the 
fact that SNA is an interdisciplinary research field. Table 2 gives an overview of this. 
Dots  Lines Discipline 
Vertices Edges Mathematics 
Nodes Links Computer Science 
Sites Bonds Physics 
Actor Ties, relations Social Science 
TABLE 2 - TERMINOLOGY USED IN NETWORK ANALYSIS 
The edges can represent different connections between the nodes as shown in Figure 2. 
The important point is that an edge is a relation in a certain respect or capacity, e.g. 
friendship, lender/borrower relation, board member etc.   
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If the vertex has no connection to other nodes in the network this is represented by a 
loop, as shown in Figure 2e). As we will see from the network analysis this might be the 
case for some firms, meaning the firm has no ties to other firms by common directors.  
         Figure 2a) represent a relationship that is a mutual connection between the two parties. 
An example is two friends, or simply two customers in the same supermarket at the 
same time, other than that it does not say anything about their relation to one another.  
Figure 2b) represents a directional relationship where in this case we can say that e.g. 2 
is a borrower from 1, or 2 is 1’s daughter. In the case of a firm this relation can show 
who reports to whom. Relationship 2b) can be said to be asymmetric which brings us to 
2c).  
Figure 2c) relationship is symmetric and can represent two people,1 and 2, that like 
each other or two colleagues in a firm. Depending on the network 2c) might be different 
from 2a) if there is a third option in the value of the tie.  
When a relationship contains more than two nodes, regardless of their directionality, it 
is called a multiplex relationship. This is the case for Figure 2d). As we can see a 
relationship exists between 1 and 3 through 2, an intermediary node. The directions 
indicates that the relations are not reciprocal. If this were to represent a firm structure 
we can immediately see who reports to whom. A network contains of a number of nodes 
which are all connected through one another. In the case of 2d) we can say that 1 is 
connected to 3 by two steps. If person 1 also knows person 3 directly the connection 
FIGURE 2 - UNDIRECTED AND DIRECTED POSSIBLE NETWORK RELATIONS 
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would look like Figure 3 and is called a sociogram9. Here all three nodes are directly 
connected and since the edges are symmetric, this is a balanced or transitive network. 
 
 
In this example, it is easy to see the connections and analyse its characteristics of the 
network, however, this is not as easy when the network expands. When working with 
network data many analysts prefer to work algebraically. The same goes for generating 
networks using software10. Figure 3 is represented in matrix form in Table 3 and is 
called The Adjacency Matrix. Figure 3 is an undirected network, and the accompanying 
matrix shown below defines how nodes are related to each other:  
 Node 1 Node 2 Node 3 
Node 1 0 1 1 
Node 2 1 0 1 
Node 3 1 1 0 
TABLE 3 - ADJACENCY MATRIX 
In a complete network all nodes are connected with each other. In the latter matrix, 
edge values would have the value 1 (or any other relevant value but zero). However, in 
real life networks this is rarely the case and the matrix is therefore said to be a sparse 
matrix meaning there will be more zeroes than other values. 
The affiliation network as it is analysed in this thesis is a simple undirected graph, it 
does not contain multiple edges or ties between an actor and a given event. 
                                                        
9 This definition was presented by Jacob Moreno (1953) which is by many claimed to be the founder of 
modern network studies, cited in Kadushin, 2012. 
10 Such as NodeXL, Pajak or similar.  
FIGURE 3 - MULTIPLEX RELATIONSHIPS 
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4.1.1.1 SINGLE MODE AND TWO-MODE NETWORKS 
In a one-mode network there is only one category (or mode) of nodes, e.g. people being 
friends or not. In this case any node can be connected to any other node in the network.  
In a two-mode network there are two categories (or modes) of nodes e.g. members and 
organizations. In this case all edges are between the two different modes and not 
between e.g. people. For this reason, two-mode networks are referred to affiliation 
networks (Wasserman & Faust, 1994 p.31). By definition an affiliation network consists 
of at least two sets of vertices (such that affiliation networks connects vertices from one 
set to vertices of another set). In this thesis there are two sets of vertices, thus it is a 
two-mode or bipartite network. One set is called actors, the other events. The vertices 
that represent actors are in this case directors and CEOs. The other mode represent a 
set of events to which the actors belong, in this case the firm boards. 
Affiliations connect directors or CEOs (actors) to boards of firms (events). Since an 
affiliation does not connect actors to actors and events to events, at least not directly, 
the Adjacency Matrix will for a two-mode network look different according to events 
they are connected to.  
 Firm X Firm Y Firm Z 
Board member 1 1 1 0 
Board member 2 1 0 0 
Board member 3 1 1 1 
TABLE 4 - TWO-MODE ADJACENCY MATRIX 
As seen from Table 4, the Matrix now gives information about two things, namely actors 
and events. Board member 1 is represented on two boards and therefore firm A and B is 
formally connected. Board member 2 only has one directorship. Board member three on 
the other hand has three directorships. 
With these basics established I move on to the measuring of centrality which can be 
done both for the actors and the events as well as for the network as a whole.  
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4.2 MEASURING NETWORKS 
Most network measures are defined for the structure of one-mode networks, and then 
applied with necessary additional conditions to two-mode networks. The analytical 
strategy applied reduces two-mode networks to two one-mode networks, an agent 
network (board members) and an events network (firms). Specific social network 
analysis is performed on event and actors networks separately in this study. 
Accordingly, various relevant network measures will be defined relating to one-mode 
networks. 
Board members cannot have more than one tie to a given board, meaning that they have 
only one type of relation to the board, namely as board member. The membership might 
have different qualities: member, chairman or deputy chairman of the board. 
CEOs are also included in the network analysis, obviously not as board members11, but 
as executive directors. This is a logical addition when the goal is to study formalised 
information flow channels between firms. It is important to notice though, that 
according to regulations by law, CEOs cannot have the status as board member in 
his/her own firm.  
4.2.1 ONE-MODE NETWORKS 
4.2.1.1 PARTITION 
A partition of a network is a classification of the vertices in the network such that each 
vertex is assigned to one class. An example is the board member role or gender. These 
are discrete properties.  Partitions split a network into parts, and can be used to reduce 
networks. One reduction in this network could be the network of all female board 
members. 
4.2.1.2 VECTORS 
Partitions assign discrete values to vertices or nodes. Vectors may be used to assign 
continuous values to vertices. This could, as an example, be the age of a board member. 
                                                        
11 As Norway practice a two-tier system, which prohibits the CEO to sit on the board of directors. 
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4.2.1.3 COHESIVE SUBGROUPS 
Social networks usually contain pockets of people who “stick together” (Nooy et al, 2005 
p.71). These are called cohesive subgroups. Various measures are applied to identify 
cohesive subgroups. 
● Path: a walk in which no vertex in between the first and last vertex (of the walk) 
occurs more than once. Geodesic is the shortest path between two vertices. 
● Distance: the distance from one vertex to another is the length of the geodesic 
between them. 
● Density: the number of edges in a network expressed as the proportion of the 
maximum possible number of edges in the network. 
● Completeness: A complete network is a network with maximum density (all 
possible ties are drawn). 
● Degree: the number of edges a node has. 
● Adjacent nodes: two nodes are adjacent if they are connected with an edge. 
● Components: Components are connected parts of networks. Defining components 
in undirected networks require introduction of some new concepts: 
○ A (undirected) network is connected if there is a path along edges for 
each pair of vertices where any vertex along the path is only visited once. 
○ A component is a connected sub-network. 
○ In an undirected network components are isolated from each other. 
○ The giant component (GC) is the component in the network with the most 
number of vertices attached. 
● Communities: Modularity is often used in optimization methods for detecting 
community structure in networks.  A network is said to have “community 
structure” if the nodes of the network can be grouped into sets of nodes such that 
each set of nodes is densely connected internally. In applying a modularity 
analysis it is interesting to see if and how the giant component has a community 
structure, and how the structure has developed from 2001 to 2010. Modularity is 
one measure of the structure of networks or graphs. The idea is to measure the 
strength of division of a network into modules (also called communities or 
clusters). Networks with high modularity have dense connections between the 
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nodes within modules but sparse connections between nodes in different 
modules. 
○ Louvain modularity detection (included in the Pajek software package) is 
a frequently applied approach. The general idea of the Louvain method is 
to start out with a partition in which each node is in its own a community. 
The method is then a greedy optimization method in iterative steps. In 
greedy optimization, the concept of “cover” is applied. A subset A' of the 
set (the community) A is said to cover the set (the community) B if and 
only if every vertex in B is connected to at least one vertex of A’. The 
algorithm keeps track of which vertices are covered by what community. 
In iterative steps, a greedy criterion applies a procedure whereby a vertex 
of A is selected that covers the largest number of uncovered vertices of B 
and so on until no improvement is achieved in the next iterative run of the 
procedure. Thus, the Louvain optimization is performed in two steps. 
First, the method looks for "small" communities by optimizing modularity 
locally. Second, it aggregates nodes belonging to the same community and 
builds a new network whose nodes are the communities. These steps are 
repeated iteratively until a maximum of modularity is attained and a 
hierarchy of communities is produced. 
4.2.1.4 BROKERAGE 
This study is about information flow in institutionalised structures, exchange between 
actors in boards under the normative conditions expressed in NCBE. The network is a 
representation of a social structure that should help in explaining or analysing the 
diffusion of information in a formal structure. In analysing the social structure it is of 
interest to find vertices that have a more central position in the information exchange 
than others. These are known as centrality measures and definitions are taken from 
Jackson (2008) and Nooy et al. (2011, p.399): 
● Degree  
○ Degree centrality of a vertex is its degree. 
○ Degree centralization of a network is the variation in the degrees of 
vertices divided by the maximum degree variation that is possible in the 
network of the same size. 
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● Closeness 
○ Closeness centrality of a vertex is the number of other vertices divided by 
the sum of all distances between the vertex and all others. It is a measure 
of how long it will take to spread information from a given vertex to all 
other vertices and is measured by analysing the shortest path to all 
others. 
○ Closeness centralization is the variation in the closeness centrality of 
vertices divided by the maximum variation in closeness centrality scores 
possible in a network of the same size. 
● Betweenness 
○ Betweenness centrality of a vertex is the proportion of all paths between 
pair of other vertices that include this vertex. Betweenness centrality tells 
us how important a node is in terms of connecting other vertices. 
○ Betweenness centralization is the variation in the closeness centrality of 
vertices divided by the maximum variation in closeness centrality scores 
possible in the network of the same size. 
● Eigenvector  
○ Eigenvector centrality of a vertex is the extent to which it is linked to 
vertices with high eigenvector centrality. Eigenvector centrality is a 
neighbour’s characteristics indication on how important, central or 
influential a node's neighbours are.  
4.2.2 TWO-MODE NETWORKS 
Having introduced various measures relating to one-mode networks, adjustments 
necessary to analyse two-mode networks must be discussed. In analysing two-mode 
networks it is important to distinguish between actors and events, because measures 
derived from simple networks have different meanings for actors and events. Things 
can get quite complicated when analysing two-mode networks. According to Nooy et al 
(2011), the solution commonly used is to transform two-mode networks into two one-
mode networks that can be analysed with standard techniques. A couple of terms has to 
be introduced when two-mode networks are transformed to two one-mode networks – 
e.g. one network consisting of actors (board members) and one consisting of events 
(firm boards). In the case of deriving a one-mode network of events, firm boards in our 
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case, lines are drawn between events that share actors (board members). This has two 
consequences: 
● Since firm boards or events can share more than one actor or board member, we 
can get multiple lines between the same two nodes. Multiple lines can be 
replaced by a single line with an attached value, e.g. 3 if 2 firms share 2 directors. 
This is called a valued network, which in the example has a line multiplicity of 3. 
Such valued networks are not used in this study. 
● Events, or firm boards, may have board members they share with no other event. 
In that case the node has a loop with a line multiplicity equal to the number of 
board members the event does not share with any other event. Such loops are 
removed in this study.  
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5 DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
5.1 SAMPLE SELECTION 
Data for this study is collected from The Brønnøysund Register Centre (BRC, 2014)12. 
BRC is a government body under the Norwegian Ministry of Trade and Industry, and 
consists of several different national registers. 
This network study is limited to Norwegian ASA firms both listed and non-listed on the 
Oslo Stock Exchange. Both financial and non-financial firms are included in the study. 
Furthermore, the sample period is limited to years 2000-2010. It consists of 
information about board of directors and CEOs for a total of 1068 firms and 7803 
unique names. Both directors and CEO birth years are included as well as their role on 
the board (chair, deputy chair or member). 
As this dataset is confined to ASA boards, it represents a subset of, probably a more, 
comprehensive directorship network than what extends to for example AS. 
Consequently, firms that in this study seem to have no shared directors might have 
connections to other ASAs through an intermediate AS. 
5.2 DATA PROCESSING 
Information from BRC is processed in Microsoft Excel13 to prepare data for social 
network analysis software. Mainly, this part consists of changing codes from text to 
numbers. For example, the role of individual board members was labelled “leader” or 
“member” and this is transformed into numbers so that one equals to leader and so on.  
For practical reasons, board member names have been anonymised using a number 
coding system of four numbers. Individual members are not the focus in this thesis but 
rather the network structures and how firms are connected. 
Additionally, the dataset did not contain gender information for any of the directors. 
This has been generated using publicly available name list for men and women. Where 
                                                        
12 In Norwegian called Brønnøysundregisteret 
13 http://office.microsoft.com/nb-no/excel/ 
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the firm information is incomplete, it has simply been marked 9999 indicating that the 
information is missing. Missing data (2001=30 firms, 2004= 29 firms, 2006= 15 firms, 
2008=12 firms and 2010= 5 firms) is removed when generating network images and 
central measurements. This missing information is not suspected to bias the overall 
sample. 
The dataset is partly described for all years in the period and partly for a selection of 
years (2001, 2004, 2006, 2008 and 2010). The selection of years is done with reference 
to implementation of GBL and the financial crisis. Part of the analysis consist of studying 
community for firms (event network) in years 2001 and 2010. 2001 is chosen because 
the number of ASAs was at its peak this year. 2010 is chosen due to being the final year 
of the dataset. Between 2001 and 2010 the effects of GBL and probably also the financial 
crisis has played out and a new normal had been established, at least concerning board 
structure. 
5.3 SOCIAL NETWORK ANALYSIS SOFTWARE PROGRAMS 
The network analysis is conducted by using Pajek and NodeXL14. 
5.3.1 NODE XL 
NodeXL is a template for Microsoft Excel that is used for visualisation of the network as 
a whole (two-mode network), mainly to illustrate how gender balance has developed 
through the dataset period15.  
5.3.2 PAJEK 
Pajek16 enables analysis of large networks with thousands of vertices in both one- and 
two-mode networks. It holds the ability to transfer two-mode into one-mode networks 
which has been utilized to extract centrality measurements. All exploration of giant 
components for the chosen years is done in Pajek. For definition of giant component see 
                                                        
14 Both open-source software programs 
15 http://nodexl.codeplex.com/ 
16 http://pajek.imfm.si/doku.php 
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4.2.1.3. Additionally, the surviving firms and gender centrality scores are explored with 
Pajek. Model graphs are created from this software as well. 
Pajek is applied to detect Louvain community as described earlier. Nooy et al (2011) 
decision tree for the analysis of cohesive subgroups has worked as guidance throughout 
the analysis period of this study. Referring to Appendix 1. 
5.4 CHARACTERISTICS 
General characteristics about the sample selection is described below. Table 5 gives an 
overview of the numbers of ASAs and the reduction over time.  
Year Number of ASA’s Δ number of ASA in % 
2000 603 100,0 % 
2001 631 104,6 % 
2002 601 99,7 % 
2003 556 92,2 % 
2004 523 86,7 % 
2005 495 82,1 % 
2006 506 83,9 % 
2007 484 80,3 % 
2008 415 68,8 % 
2009 362 60,0 % 
2010 339 56,2 % 
Relative to 2001 
TABLE 5 - DEVELOPMENT IN NUMBER OF FIRMS IN THE DATASET 
As seen from Table 5, the number of ASAs have been almost halved between 2000 and 
2010. Although the rate of reduction seems to be constant over time, the most 
prominent reduction occurred between 2006 and 2007 when 11.5 % of the firms exited. 
The GBL was by 2007 effective for new firms and the transition period for existing firms 
ended a year later in 2008. By 2008 all firms had de facto complied. Between 2008-2009 
and 2009-2010 there is a continued decrease in the number of ASA of 8.8 % and 3.8 % 
respectively, and therefore there is no reason to assume that this reduction is 
attributable to GBL. Thus, it seems plausible to assume that there are other 
circumstances causing this decrease - such as the financial crisis. I will not speculate 
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upon this as the data material does not give sufficient information. Due to the massive 
reduction, some firms have a short tenure in the dataset. Figure 4 shows the 
distribution of firms in relation to how many years’ they are present in the database. 
 
FIGURE 4 - NUMBER OF YEARS IN DATASET FOR TOTALLY 1068 FIRMS 
As shown in the Figure 4 above, four years is the most frequent number of years firms 
are in the database, followed by five years. Figure 4 does not show which year’s firms 
are in the database, nor will this be studied further in this paper. 127 firms have eleven 
years duration in the dataset and these firms will in the following be referred to as 
“survivors”. Survivor centrality is relevant for hypothesis 6 and 7. Despite the decrease 
in ASA the female fraction has increased substantially due to GBL as shown in the Figure 
5. 
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FIGURE 5 - YEARLY DEVELOPMENT IN NUMBER OF ASA AND FEMALE FRACTION 
The solid line in Figure 5 (relating to right vertical axes), represents the decrease in 
number of ASA. The decreasing trend stagnates between 2004 and 2007 however, it 
continues to decreases after 2007. Female fraction increase over time, however, this 
trend ends abruptly in 2008 when the 40% representation requirement is reached.  
This might indicate that there is no willingness to go beyond the minimum requirement. 
That goes against the reasoning behind advocates of GBL as discussed earlier, but is in 
line with Seierstad and Opsahl (2006). 
Figure 5 shows the fraction of female board members of the total available directorship 
positions in ASA firms. Edling et al. (2012) find that by 2005, 87 % of firms in their 
sample had at least one female director. However, as seen for Figure 5, in 2005 female 
directors in total only amounts to ≈20 % of all available director positions, and 
consequently the GBL was enforced. Figure 6 gives an overview of board size in the 
dataset. 
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FIGURE 6 - AVERAGE BOARD SIZE 
Average board size does not fluctuate much over the total period but stays within 5 and 
5.5 board members. However, standard deviation as well as average board size 
increases yearly from 2007 and onwards. This means that we observe an increase in 
variation in board size for ASA firms and average board size increases. This could 
indicate that instead of replacing male directors with female, firms that remain an ASA 
chose to increase the board size to keep a larger fraction of male directors on the board 
by “adding” women until the GBL quota is filled. Remembering how firms that exited 
had few female directors (Bøhren and Staubo, 2012), this is a possible action taken by 
firms. 
Moving on to age distribution, Figure 7, represents age distribution by year.  
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FIGURE 7 - INDEXED AGE DISTRIBUTION 
There is a clear shift in age distribution towards board members being older. Especially, 
the interval 65-70 and onwards experience a steady holding of directorships which also 
seem to increase over time. Knowing that the total number of board seats decreases17, it 
is clear that the older are the ones to keep their directorship(s). In the dataset, young 
people extending to approximately 40 years of age are more frequently the drop-outs. 
Hence, overall there is a shift in age on board members towards being older. The 
observation is consistent with previous literature, which states that directors with 
CEO/CFO or similar experience increase in firm value (Ahren and Dittmar, 2010). In 
absence of GBL it is likely to assume that firms had both young and old directors so that 
the older ones could educate the younger on conducting sufficient monitoring and 
advising. A possible long-term effect of the GBL is that young women get educated on 
the directorship role to a lager extent than their male colleagues, hence leaving a 
smaller pool of competent male directors in the future. 
The above figure is created from all director seats. Sorting directorship by gender, as 
                                                        
17  as they do over time because of the decrease in ASA 
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done in Figure 8 (below), the latter trend is prominent. 
 
FIGURE 8 - DEVELOPMENT IN AGE ISTRIBUTION BY GENDER 
The decrease in sub-fifty aged male directorships is remarkable. Male directors of 65 
and above keep a steady amount of board positions while men under 50 are the ones to 
be elected away. In the female distribution, an initial period with recruitment of 
relatively younger females extending to 2008 is seen. Post 2008, a similar “correction” of 
female board member age is seen towards older individuals. This late adjustment is, as 
one can see, in line with the male directorship age preference. This might be an 
indication of the fact that after the transition period ended and the situation normalised, 
there was a natural selection of female board member probably based on experience 
and age as with male board members. As the gender/age development is different 
especially with consideration to number of directors in the database, it is natural to 
examine both genders in the analysis.  
Figure 9 presents women holding chair roles in the board and CEO role. 
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FIGURE 9 - FEMALE FRACTION OF CEO AND CHAIR POSITIONS 
Looking at female holding chair roles in boards there is an increase from 2% to 9% 
throughout the decade, hence 350%. Females CEOs experience a small decrease before 
increasing in line with chair role. However, for either, it is far from the 40% gender 
representation. 
On the following page (Figure 10) is an illustration of the networks, in two-mode, as 
they develop through the decade. Two features are to be noticed. 1) Female fraction 
increases and 2) Networks become sparse as firms exit. By 2010, the network contained 
directorships distributed with roughly 40% female and 60% male fraction.  
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FIGURE 10 - VISUALIZATION OF TWO–MODE NETWORK IN 2001,2003,2006,2008 AND 2010.  
  
MADE IN NODEXL WITH ALGORITHM HAREL-KOREN FAST MULTISCALE. EVENTS (FIRMS) ARE 
SHOWN BY TRIANGLES, BLACK BEEING SURVIVORS AND WHITE OTHER FIRMS. ACTORS 
(BOARD MEMBERS) SHOWN AS BLUE FOR MALE AND PINK FOR FEMALE. GREEN EDGES 
INDICATING THAT ACTOR IS IN FACT A CEO NOT BOARD MEMBER. 
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The illustrations above do not, however, reveal the component structures in the 
networks. For this purpose, Pajek is powerful tool. The entailing figure illustrates this 
for the 2010 network. Apart for 2010 being a more sparse network, the component 
structure is similar to preceding years. Figure 11 shows clearly that the network 
consists of: 
 A large number of boards with no inter-firm relations (the lower part of the 
illustration). These firms do not share any board member with other ASA firms 
in 2010. Apart from this characteristic we do not know more about the board 
composition. One interesting observation however is that 33 of 119 of these 
firms, which have no shared board members with other ASA firms, are survivors. 
There is reason to believe that these firms are part of networks which consist of 
firms with other organizational forms such as AS or similar. 
 A handful of inter-firm relations with between 2-4 firms (upper right corner). 
This group has 14 survivors and 23 other firms.  It is not inconceivable that 
survivors have contributed to innovation leading to new firms. This is 
mentioned more as a curiosity than for any other purpose. The very upper right 
network shows 4 firms which are all connected by one board member who is 
also a woman. This is also the case for six of the other “mini-networks” in this 
group. 
 A giant component that consistently covers roughly ⅔ of ASA firm boards 
(upper left). It is more difficult to visually inspect this component from Figure 
11.  
Moving on, I use the giant component to extract centrality measures. For the 
remaining years, the component structure is presented and summarized in Table 6 
below. 
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FIGURE 11 –NETWORK VISUALIZATION FOR 2010 OF SEPARATE COMPONENTS. 
CREATED IN PAJEK UTILIZING KAMADA-KAWAI ALGORITHM. THE GIANT COMPONENT (UPPER LEFT) COVERS 62% OF THE FIRMS FOR 2010. TRIANGLES 
REPRESENT FIRMS WHERE BLACK IS SURVIVORS AND WHITE ARE OTHER FIRMS. BLUE NODES ARE MALE BOARD MEMBERS AND PINK ARE FEMALE. 
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6 RESULTS 
Up to this point the study has describes how network analysis may be used to understand 
and reveal network structures in Norwegian ASA board by looking at both director (actors) 
and firms (events) connections. The number of ASAs decreases by almost 50% throughout 
the decade and 127 firms are present all sample years. The female fraction was at 40% by 
2008 and has not increased later. Mean board size between 2000 and 2010 is five directors, 
however, the standard deviation increase in the later years. The age of directors has gone 
toward male directors being, on average, older and female directors on average five years 
younger than their male colleagues.  
Following, is a presentation of results, divided into two parts, event/firm network and 
actor network/directorship-CEO network. The analysis is followed by model graph analysis 
and lastly concluding remarks. 
6.1 EVENT NETWORK 
As seen in Pajek visualisation (Figure 11) on event network in 2010 there is a giant 
component, a collection of smaller network components and finally firms with no inter-
firm connections (hence, these firms count as a component each). Table 6 shows how 
nodes in the giant component is distributes through the years. 
Year Number 
of firms 
Number of 
components 
Number of nodes in 
GC 
Fraction of nodes in GC 
2001 630 147 441 nodes 70 % 
2004 521 145 329 nodes 63 % 
2006 505 147 316 nodes 63 % 
2008 414 134 252 nodes 61 % 
2010 338 111 208 nodes 62 % 
TABLE 6 - NUMBER OF FIRMS IN TOTAL AND FRACTION IN GIANT COMPONENT 
There are some noticeable points in Table 6 above. The network in 2010 has decreased to 
half since 2001, but the fraction of nodes in the giant component remains the same post 
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2004. This means that nodes (firms) are dispersed in all parts of the total network and 
there seems to be no local preference from where the decrease is more prominent than 
elsewhere in the network. Being inside or outside the giant component seems to have no 
obvious effect on exit strategies. 
Hypothesis 1 asserts that the Norwegian ASA network consists of one giant component 
where the majority of firms are connected through directorships and CEO relations. 
Hypothesis 2 is concerned with the reduction in number of ASAs leading to structural 
changes in the network. Table 6 shows that the network consists of a giant component with 
roughly 2/3 of all nodes and 1/3 of nodes in the network outside this giant component. It 
also reveals that this distribution of nodes is approximately constant over the years with  
≈ 62 % of the nodes in the giant component. Based on this, hypothesis 1 is confirmed as 
the majority of firms are connected through directorships and CEO relations. The same 
cannot be said for hypothesis 2 since the distribution of nodes is similar throughout the 
decade. The network does not become structurally different, at least not judged by the 
visual network structure as illustrated in Figure 11. Hypothesis 2 in relation to network 
structure seems from a superficial inspection to be similar between 2000 and 2010. 
Chapter 7 will provide an in-depth analysis of the network structure. 
After studying ASA firms and their network connections through formal inter-board 
representation, it is logical to focus on the giant component as they are the ones to actually 
being part of the board membership network in Norway. Other firms, as seen in Figure 11, 
are part of micro-networks or have no network at all and hence are not relevant to the 
network-information perspective chosen. Following is centrality measures for the giant 
component. 
When studying affiliation networks the centrality measures may have different meanings. 
Therefore, centrality measures are extracted in line with Faust (1997) paper on “Centrality 
in affiliation networks”.  The author finds that it is important to have centrality measures 
for both actors and events. Extracting and comparing degree, closeness and eigenvector 
centrality is straightforward according to Faust. However, for betweenness this is not 
directly applicable between actors and events. In short, the difference in betweenness and 
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eigenvector centrality in a bipartite graph is that betweenness gives actors belonging to 
one event zero in centrality score while eigenvector gives those same actors a non-zero 
score. This shows how one must be cautious in comparing actor and event network in 
search for overlaps. Table 7 presents centrality measures for the giant component. 
Year 2001 2004 2006 2008 2010 
All degree centralization 0,0327 0,0278 0,0439 0,0516 0,0497 
Development relative to 2001* 1,0 0,9 1,3 1,6 1,5 
Degree centrality      
Mean 4,6893 3,9635 4,2278 4,1508 3,8173 
Standard deviation 3,1646 2,6746 2,9605 3,1233 2,4991 
Development* 1,0 0,8 0,9 0,9 0,8 
All closeness centralization 0,1699 0,1415 0,1593 0,1492 0,1448 
Development relative to 2001* 1,0 0,8 0,9 0,9 0,9 
Closeness centrality      
Mean 0,1828 0,1798 0,1798 0,1926 0,1846 
Standard deviation 0,0288 0,0314 0,0315 0,0348 0,0326 
All betweenness centralization 0,0848 0,0836 0,1573 0,1259 0,16 
Development relative to 2001* 1,0 1,0 1,9 1,5 1,9 
Betweenness centrality      
Mean 0,0105 0,0145 0,0151 0,0176 0,0224 
Standard deviation 0,0162 0,0195 0,0226 0,0272 0,0317 
Eigenvector centrality      
Mean 0,0081 0,0079 0,01 0,0176 0,0098 
Standard deviation 0,0469 0,0546 0,0554 0,0605 0,0686 
TABLE 7 - CENTRALITY SCORES FOR GIANT COMPONENT *INDEXED 2001 MULTIPLIED WITH 0,1 
Degree centrality is a measure of how connected a node is, and centralisation how 
connected the network as such is. The mean, as well as the standard deviation, is lower in 
2010 than in 2001, while it fluctuates some in the intermediate years. This indicates that 
nodes in the giant component become less connected through the period, probably, or 
partly at least, due to the decrease in the number of nodes. Fewer nodes (firm boards) 
means a potential for fewer edges (inter-board connections), hence potentially a reduction 
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in the achievable mean values of degree centrality. The degree centralization of the giant 
component is fairly low, but increase with a factor of 1.5 during the period. Being a 
measure of the variation in centrality scores for the vertices (firm boards) this means that 
variation is fairly low but increasing. Degree centrality, however, can be deceiving, because 
it is a purely local measure.  
The second measure of centrality in the table is closeness centrality for the individual 
nodes and closeness centralization for the giant component as a whole.  A node is 
considered important if relatively close to all other nodes, and closeness is based on the 
inverse of the distance of each node to every other node in the network. Mean values of 
closeness centrality remains more or less the same, with a slight increase in standard 
deviation. Closeness centrality is in itself low, meaning that across the giant component as a 
whole there is not much variation in closeness. Closeness centrality decreases moderately 
with a factor of 0.85, indicating that information flow in the network as a whole becomes 
more demanding (the geodesic increases). Closeness centralization does not indicate if 
more nodes get a more prominent position in relaying information in the network.  
A node (firm board) that lies on paths of information can control information flow, and is 
thus more important than a node that does not.  Betweenness centrality counts the number 
of shortest paths between two nodes passing through a given intermediate node. 
Interestingly enough, mean betweenness centrality increase with more than a factor 2, as 
does standard deviation. The variation in betweenness centralization increases with a 
factor 1.9. This indicates that the relative number of nodes (firm boards) in the giant 
component that act as gatekeepers in the information flow increases, as do the variation 
between nodes (firm boards) - all in all the information flow becomes more structured 
through a given set of walks in the network. This may be seen as a consequence of decrease  
of the network size, while retaining the same overall structure. 
Eigenvector centrality is a measure dependent on neighbour characteristics, and indicates 
how important, central or influential a node's neighbours are. Throughout the decade, this 
score is fairly stable with an exception of 2010 where it is higher and the standard 
deviation is lower than the year before. 
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To sum up the structural changes in the giant component: The number of nodes are being 
cut to about a half in the period, but the structure remains remarkably stable with a smaller 
adjustment towards fewer and more prominent information paths in the giant component 
of the network. 
6.1.1 SURVIVORS 
There are 79 survivors in the giant component in 2010. However, only 69 of these surviving 
firms was also in the giant component in 2001. In the following centrality scores are 
extracted for both. 
The analysis show that there is no evidence to suggest that surviving firms are connected to 
other surviving firms to a lager extent than to other firms in the network, howere they ar 
slightly more central in terms on betweenness centrality by 2010 (Table 8). 
Table 8 holds a comparison of the development in survivors and other firms in regard to 
centrality measures. Survivors have somewhat higher centrality measures by the end of 
2010 relative to other firms in the giant component. 
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Centrality   2001 2001 2001 2010 2010 2010 
   All 
Survivors 
Survivors 
GC 2001 
and 2010 
Other 
firms 
All 
Survivors 
Survivors 
GC 2001 
and 2010 
Other 
firms 
Degree Mean 4,6699 4,6877 4,6953 4,1013 4,1594 3,6434 
  Std 3,3560 2,9604 3,1139 2,5349 2,5183 2,4805 
Closeness Mean 0,1856 0,1861 0,1820 0,1883 0,1855 0,1824 
  Std 0,0295 0,0310 0,0287 0,0328 0,0303 0,0328 
Betweenness Mean 0,0131 0,0130** 0,0097 0,0251 0,0271** 0,0207 
  Std 0,0191 0,0161 0,0152 0,0329 0,0338 0,0311 
Eigenvector Mean 0,0020 0,0004 0,0099 0,0206 0,0236 0,0031 
  Std 0,0168 0,0024 0,0527 0,1052 0,1123 0,0283 
TABLE 8 - CENTRALITY SCORES IN GIANT COMPONENT DIVIDED INTO SURVIVORS AND OTHER FIRMS 
 
Table 8 show that both survivors and other firms share more or less same centrality 
measures in 2001. However, by 2010 this is no longer the case; the survivors now have 
higher values overall. Eigenvector centrality is as mentioned a neighbours’ characteristics 
that indicates how important, central or influential a node's neighbours are. In 2001 the 
survivors have a lower eigenvector score compared to other firms. Notice however how the 
situation has changed by 2010. Now the survivors have higher eigenvector score compared 
to other firms, but also a higher standard deviation. 
Conducting t-test in excel reveals that there a few significant measures. Independent 
sample t-test, both survivors and other firms have non-significant values, apart from 
degree and betweenness for other firms. This is not pursued further but rather I look at the 
survivors who are in the giant component in 2001 and 2010. A paired-sample t-test to 
evaluate the change in centrality measures reveals that the only statistical significant 
change is for betweenness scores in survivors present in giant component in both 2001 and 
2010. This show that there is a statistically significant increase in betweenness scores from 
2001 (Mean= 0.0130, SD=0.0161) to 2010 (Mean= 0.0271, SD=0.0338), t (68) = -3.42, p < 
** P<0.01 (TWO-TAILED INDEPENDENT SAMPLE T-TEST) 
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0.01 (two-tailed). The mean increase in betweenness centrality is 0.0141 with a 95% 
confidence interval ranging from -0.02 to -0.01. The eta squared statistics (0.14) indicates a 
large effect size (Pallant, 2010 p.243). 
This indicated that the network development with its exogenous shocks have left survivors 
to be part of strong influential and highly informed communities. With this knowledge, 
hypothesis 6; surviving firms have a more privileged information position in the network 
by 2010, is confirmed. 
6.1.2 COMMUNITY STRUCTURES 
For 2001 (Figure 13) and 2010 (Figure 14) a network illustration of firms with vertex 
according to betweenness centrality is extracted. Remembering how the number of ASAs 
decrease throughout the decade this is shown much clearer with network analysis. 
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FIGURE 12 - 2001 COMMUNITY STRUCTURE IN GIANT COMPONENT.
CREATED IN PAJEK WITH LOUVIAN COMMUNITY ALGORYTHM. VERTEX SIZE ACCORDING TO BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY. 
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FIGURE 13 - 2010 COMMUNITY STRUCTURE IN GIANT COMPONENT 
CREATED IN PAJEK WITH LOUVIAN COMMUNITY ALGORYTHM. VERTEX SIZE ACCORDING TO BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY. 
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The 2001 network contained 21 communities more specifically referred to Loviant 
communities18. Vertex size is defined by the firm’s betweenness centrality in giant 
component. Table 10 shows each community’s biggest vertex in 2001, for a full table see 
Appendix 3. 
Component Highest betweenness vertex Total firms in component 
1 Håg (103) 32 
2 Privatbanken (410) 39 
3 Schibsted (124) 30 
4 Aker Kværner (84) 22 
5 Arendal Fossekompani (42) 11 
6 Prosafe (281) 31 
7 Genomar (249) 11 
8 Norse Energy Corp (308) 29 
9 Oslo Børs (425) 7 
10 Whitecliff (311) 20 
11 Tusenfryd (148) 40 
12 Atea (86) 24 
13 Axxessit (353) 10 
14 Akershus Formueforvaltning (390) 8 
15 Investra (24) 23 
16 Vmetro (150) 16 
17 Bjørge (104) 29 
18 Inaq (389) 19 
19 Marineprovider (186) 19 
20 Storebrand (75) 21 
TABLE 9 - 2001 HIGH BETWEENNES FIRMS IN COMMUNITY STRUCTIRE. 
 
Moving on to how the network looks in 2010 it is clear that there are fewer communities 
and vertices in total. For a full table of firms in 2010 see appendix 4. To understand more 
                                                        
18 When creating this network, standard settings in Pajek is used. 
GREY INDICATED THAT THIS FIRM IS THE ONLY FIRM IN 2010 WITH HIGHEST BETWEENNESS CENTRALITY STATUS 
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about how the network has developed with the exogenous shocks Table 11 compares how 
survivors have changed their network relations over time. 
Com 2001 Vertex 2001 Firm name Com2010 Vertex 2010 
3 66 Norsk Hydro 1 30 
4 407 Telenor 1 115 
5 5 Gyldendal 1 1 
5 42 Arendals Fossekompani 1 19 
5 54 Fondsfinans 1 25 
5 376 Fondsfinans Kapitalforvaltning 1 112 
6 155 Kongsberg Gruppen 1 62 
10 202 Ekornes 1 80 
11 56 Glamox 1 26 
19 74 Petroleum Geo-Services 1 34 
1 81 Veidekke 2 36 
2 10 Eltek 2 4 
3 8 Eksportfinans 2 2 
3 53 Norske Skogindustrier 2 24 
6 88 Aktieselskabet Borgestad 2 37 
8 129 Edb Business Partner 2 51 
9 424 Oslo Børs Holding 2 119 
9 425 Oslo Børs 2 120 
11 100 Scana Industrier 2 42 
11 234 Opera Software 2 90 
20 127 Farstad Shipping 2 50 
1 118 Akva Group 3 48 
2 91 Dno 3 38 
2 280 Petrolia 3 96 
3 9 Norgesgruppen 3 3 
3 94 Statoil 3 40 
8 181 Aktiv Kapital 3 71 
12 163 Aker Biomarine 3 66 
13 20 Wicom | Ignis 3 7 
16 197 Marine Harvest 3 79 
16 342 Ulstein Group 3 108 
7 11 Bonheur 4 5 
7 111 Ganger Rolf 4 45 
7 283 Fred Olsen Energy 4 97 
3 230 Cermaq 5 87 
3 309 Kebony 5 101 
8 158 Fearnley Fonds 5 63 
15 192 Guard Systems 5 77 
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16 93 Green Reefers 5 39 
16 159 Solstad Offshore 5 64 
20 64 Rieber & Søn 5 29 
20 343 Global Geo Services 5 109 
3 152 Kongsberg Automotive 6 61 
3 178 Biotec 6 69 
8 212 Bionor Pharma 6 83 
17 112 Marine Farms 6 47 
19 38 Abg Sundal Collier Norge 6 11 
19 185 Abg Sundal Collier 6 73 
6 59 Hardanger Sunnhordlandske Dampskipsselskap 7 28 
7 43 Eidsiva Rederi 7 21 
13 414 Cappit 7 116 
16 211 Nordic Semiconductor 7 82 
16 260 Tgs Nopec Geophysical Company 7 93 
19 39 Apptix 7 12 
19 323 Acta Holding 7 104 
4 57 Hafslund 9 27 
15 193 Norsk Tillitsmann 9 78 
20 75 Storebrand 9 35 
20 169 Finansbanken 9 67 
2 45 Blom 10 22 
2 337 Itera 10 107 
6 149 Ecuanor 10 60 
12 226 Data Respons 10 86 
11 46 Orkla 11 23 
11 97 Tomra Systems 11 41 
11 218 Photocure 11 84 
11 336 Komplett 11 106 
1 101 Tandberg Data 12 43 
2 67 Vital Forsikring 12 31 
2 368 Dnb Holding 12 111 
8 308 Norse Energy Corp. 12 100 
17 119 Tts Group 12 49 
3 68 Bn Bank 13 32 
6 69 Hurtigruten 13 33 
10 387 Imarex 13 113 
19 221 Eitzen Maritime Services 13 85 
20 356 Norsk Oppgjørssentral 13 110 
6 184 Domstein 14 72 
16 108 Austevoll Havfiske 14 44 
16 132 Dof 14 52 
TABLE 10 - FIRMS BOTH IN 2001 AND 2010 WITH COMMUNITY DETECTION
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From this analysis, both Figure 13 and 14 and also Table 10, we see that the connections 
between firms change over the decade. Table 10 shows that some firms are connected 
throughout the period and hence their part of the same communities, but there are also 
firms that change their connections.  
There are especially two communities that are interesting when considering development 
of networks: 
 Community 1 in the 2010 network had 11 firms in 2001 and has 4 firms in the same 
community in 2010. The only firm to keep the highest betweenness in its giant 
component over ten years is in community 1, namely Arendal Fossekompani.  
 Community 2 seems to be a new network consisting of firms from different 2001 
communities, 1, 2,3,6,8,9,11 and 20. How this has happen is not known by this 
surface study of communities.  
Apart from communities 1 and 2 in 2010, the other communities consist of new “clusters” 
with firms from different 2001 communities. For example, community 3 consists of two 
firms from 2001 community 2, 3 and 16. Similar can be said for community 11 that had 40 
firms in 2001 who by 2010 this community have 7 firms in which 4 remains from the 2001 
community. 
As the latter describes, there is a change in the event network and hypothesis 2 is 
confirmed. The reduction in the number of ASAs seem to have led to significant changes in 
the inter-firm network structure. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is kept when relating to the 
individual firms but not to the network structure as a whole.   
6.2 ACTOR NETWORK AND GENDER DIVERSITY 
As we know GBL has changed the network for directorship in ASA firms. Mean 
betweenness centrality for female directors is by 2010 1.45 times the size for male 
directors when directors without betweenness centrality (hence =0) is removed. This 
shows that female directors in the giant component more frequently have brokerage 
positions by multiple directorship in the network than male directors. That being true, 
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female betweenness centrality also has a higher standard deviation. Appendix 2 contains 
the top and bottom 20 female eigenvector scores in giant component and as this shows the 
score is highly irregular explaining this standard deviation. Table 9 give a overwiev of the 
gender diversity status for the year 2010 in relation to all chosen centrality measures. 
Centrality measures divided by gender in GC Female Male Female >0 Male >0 
Degree centrality     
Mean 9,0358** 7,7268**   
Standard deviation 5,6070 3,8656   
Closeness centrality     
Mean 0,1624 0,1627   
Standard deviation 0,0263 0,0250   
Betweenness centrality     
Mean 0,0077** 0,0034** 0,0320 0,0220 
Standard deviation 0,0225 0,0131 0,0367 0,0267 
Eigenvector  centrality     
Mean 0,0088 0,0085   
Standard deviation 0,0274 0,0293   
Number of actors 363 754 87 116 
Gender balance in GC 32,5 % 67,5 %   
TABLE 11 - CENTRALITY FOR GENDER-DIVERSITY IN GIANT COMPONENT 2010 
 
An independent sample t-test (equal variance not assumed) to compare the change in 
centrality measures by gender reveals that two centrality measures is statistical significant, 
namely degree and betweenness.  
Degree centrality show that there is a statistically significant difference between male and 
female directors in 2010. There is a significant difference in scores for female (Mean= 
9.0358, SD=5.6070) and male (Mean= 7.7268, SD=3.8656); t (534.7) = -4.085 , p < 0.01 
(two-tailed). The magnitude of the difference in the means (mean difference = 1.309, 95% 
CI: 1,97 to 0.69. The eta squared statistics (0.03) indicates a small effect attributable to 
gender (Pallant, 2010 p. 243).  
** P<0.01 (TWO-TAILED INDEPENDENT SAMPLE T-TEST) 
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Betweenness centrality show that there is a statistically significant difference between 
male and female directors in 2010. There is a significant difference in scores for female 
(Mean= 0.0077, SD=0.0225) and male (Mean= 0.0034, SD=0.0131); t (483.5) = -3.336 , p < 
0.01 (two-tailed). The magnitude of the difference in the means (mean difference = 0.0043, 
95% CI: -0.068 to -0.002. The eta squared statistics (0.022) indicates a small effect on 
gender. 
The betweenness score may be interpreted as the ”golden skirts” reported by Seierstad and 
Opsahl (2011). Figure 14 is a visualisation of directors in the giant component with vertex 
size according to centrality status. A big vertex indicates that the person has a high 
centrality. For instance, the more boards one sits on the higher betweenness one has. As 
seen in Figure 14 (below) there is a handful of women holding the dominant vertex size, 
however as seen in table 11 giant component consists of 42.1% female and 57.1% male 
directors. Additionally only 24% (female) and 15.4% (male) actually have a betweenness 
centrality, the remaining only have one directorship. 
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FIGURE 14 – ACTOR NETWORK IN 2010 SHOWING CENTRALITY MEASURES AS VERTEX SIZE AND GENDER. 
  
 
 
61 
 
It becomes clear how betweenness and eigenvector centrality weighs actors relations 
differently. In betweenness centrality female directors dominate the network structure. In 
eigenvector centrality it is more unclear, however, we know from Table 11 that the male 
has a slightly higher score. Based on betweenness centrality there is reason to believe that 
there are female directors in the network who hold privileged positions in information 
flows between firms (hypothesis 3). This analysis however is not sufficient to reveal which 
female directors these are or how they are positioned compared to male directors beyond 
the visual inspection and the centrality measures. 
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7 ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
The purpose of this chapter is conduct an in-depth analysis of the network structure. 
“A statistical network model is a mathematical description of a collection of possible 
networks and a probability distribution on this set” (Nooy et al, 2011). 
Model networks (graphs) are mathematical representations introduced in an attempt to 
describe and understand real systems. These graphs are based on statistical network 
models with some basic rules assigning probabilities to links between any set of nodes and 
are useful in community detection, where they may act as null models. Model graphs have 
no community structure, and may therefore be used to test the outcome of various 
community detection algorithms. Model graphs are also of interest in characterizing the 
type of network as such. If a real network can be shown to have features that resemble a 
given graph model this could be a basis for reasoning about and looking for features in the 
real network. 
So far this study has been limited to analysing real world networks. A main purpose of SNA 
is to detect and interpret community structures within networks (as shown in previous 
sections). When doing so, separating patterns that are purely random or accidental from 
patterns that are meaningful is central. By comparing real world networks with selected 
model graphs two interesting questions may be asked: 
 Does the real world network have characteristics that resemble a given type of 
random model graph? 
 If  yes, do other characteristics of the real world network appear more often than 
expected by chance for this type of model graph? 
Conyon and Muldoon (2006) find that Germany, UK and USA boards are similar to small 
world graph based on data from 2001, 2002 and 2003. Notice that this is based on the giant 
component, not on the network as a whole. Edling et.al. (2012) study Scandinavian board 
networks (both director and firm) from 1990 to 2005 and find that to some extent the 
networks can be characterised as small world networks however “this only holds true for 
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the network of Danish firms”. Norwegian (and Swedish) changes towards having less 
pronounced small-world resemblances. 
Pajek is used to generate various model graphs where number of nodes and edges from the 
real world network of 2010 is applied as input. This makes it possible to use Pajek as a 
“laboratory” and compare a model graph with a real world network of the same size and 
assess which graph model the network resembles the most. The real world network (for 
2010 as seen in Figure 11) is compared with three well known graph models:  
 Random graph (Bernoulli/Poisson) where input is the number of nodes and edges, 
and edge attachment to a node is not dependent on whether the node has other 
edges attached. In terms of behaviour, this would be a situation where the number 
of relations a firm has to other firms by shared board membership, is distributed 
purely by chance. That would be a case where firms are indifferent to what other 
firms they are related to by shared board memberships among its board of 
directors. Social networks are normally more clustered than a Bernoulli/Poisson 
model graph, as indicated by the clustering coefficient, as will be shown; this is the 
case in this study too. 
 Small world graph: Input is the number of nodes, and a tendency to have more links 
to neighbour nodes than to other nodes. Then one endpoint of a small portion of 
locally connected nodes are placed outside the well-connected nodes, creating links 
between locally well connected nodes. The implicit behavioural interpretation is 
that actors tend to cluster in neighbourhoods, and that links to other neighbourhood 
clusters often are few (however important in relation to information, refer to the 
discussion on the strength of weak ties in the literature review). Translating this to 
the real world network, if it is small world, one should expect a clustering or 
community structure with strong local clusters and a few but important links 
between them. This could mirror a situation where new board members are more 
often recruited from the immediate neighbourhood understood as intermediate 
circles of trusted individual, creating a number of stable communities over time. 
 
 
64 
 
 Scale free graphs are network growth models constructing a random graph by 
adding vertices and one or more lines, one at the time. The model is a preferential 
attachment model where the probability that a vertex is selected is proportional to 
its degree19. In terms of behaviour this is the “rich-get-richer” type of network, 
where a smaller number of vertices have a higher degree and new-comers prefer to 
attach to those with success/higher degree. In terms of the firm network, this would 
mean the existence of a few high degree firms and a clustering around them. Of 
course, an actor can only hold so many board positions, limiting how skewed the 
real world network of corporate boards can become. Still, the phenomenon should 
be significant and visible. 
Parameters used to compare model graphs with the real world network: 
 Clustering coefficient which is the proportion of all two-paths in the network that is 
closed. This can be interpreted as a situation where two nodes also have a third 
node in common. Clustering is expected smaller in random graphs. 
 Size of the giant component. Often found in real world social networks. 
 The distribution of vertex degrees. 
 Average degree. 
 Average path length. 
 Diameter which is often relatively small in real world social networks. 
In all chosen graphs (Random, Small world and Scale free) the comparison is comprised of 
both the whole real event network, loops removed, and a follow up of more specific 
comparative analysis of the giant component. Comparison is done by two approaches: (1) a 
visual inspection and comparison of the graph model with the real world network, and (2) 
comparing by the set of parameters above. 
 
                                                        
19 One limitation in this model is that it assumes that a vertex stays in the network throughout the growth 
process. This is not the case if we should compare our real world network as it historically develops in the 
dataset. For the study of the network any one year this is not problematic.  
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Figures 15-18 below shows the real world network compared with three model graphs ( 
with 338 nodes and 761 edges). All graphs are visualized in Pajek with Kamada-Kawai 
algorithm /separate components. 
 
FIGURE 15 - REAL WORLD EVENT NETWORK 2010 
WITH 62 % OF NODES IN GIANT COMPONENT 
 
FIGURE 16 – RANDOM MODEL GRAPH WITH 91,4 % 
OF NODES IN GIANT COMPONENT 
 
FIGURE 17 - SMALL WORLD GRAPH WITH 100 % 
OF NODES IN ONE COMPONENT 
 
FIGURE 18 - SCALE FREE MODEL GRAPH WITH 51 
% OF NODES  IN GIANT COMPONENT 
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(1) A purely visual inspection of the various graphs compared with the 2010 event network 
shows more familiar features with a scale free model graph, than any of the other model 
graphs when including the whole ASA network as shown earlier in the paper, ref. Figure 11.  
(2) To compare the real world graph with the various model graph parameters it requires 
nodes to be connected, hence the giant component. For the Random model graph and the 
Small world graph a revised version with of 208 nodes and 397 lines is created, in line with 
real world network of 2010. The only exception is the Scale free network. It is called scale 
free because it more or less retains its structure as it varies in size. This again means that a 
giant component in a scale free network with fewer nodes than what is contained in the GC 
in the real world network should still be a good enough for the comparison intended here. 
Table 12 shows characteristics of the various network. 
  
Real world 
network in 2010 
Model graphs with the same size as the network in 2010 
 
Random graph 
Small world 
graph 
Scale free graph 
Giant 
component 
63 % 97,6 % 100 % 52,7 % 
Vertex 
distribution 
Figure 15 Figure 16 Figure 17 Figure 18 
Average degree 
2,49 (full 
network) 
3,82 ( GC ) 
2,83 4 
2,59(full 
network) 
4,37 (GC) 
Diameter 15 ( GC ) 7 13 7 
Clustering coef.* 0,43 ( GC ) 0,03 0,28 0,13 
Aver. Path 
length/Cluster 
coefficient 
13,04 1906 19,2 26,31 
*Watts-Strogatz Clustering Coefficient. 
TABLE 12 – REAL WORLD AND MODEL GRAPHS 
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8 CONCLUSIONS 
This thesis is concerned with understanding Norwegian ASA firm governance structures by 
describing, visualising and characterising inter-firm board of directors networks by 
applying social network analysis. This study holds several findings:  
Firstly, a network of connected firms exists and this network component connects roughly 
2/3 of all ASA firms. The relative size of this component (giant component) has remained 
unchanged throughout the decade, in spite of firms entering and exiting the ASA domain 
and in spite of an overall reduction in the number of ASA firm to roughly a half. The 
network contained, by 2010, a large fraction of female directors as regulated by law. 
However, after complying with the 40% requirement there has not been any increase in the 
female fraction. A few, both male and female, directors in the giant component actor 
network hold central positions in the network according to various centrality measures, 
especially betweenness and eigenvector centrality. There are a few female directors 
holding highly prominent position in the network, which very well might be the “golden 
skirts”. This goes against the reasoning behind advocates of GBL as discussed earlier, 
especially decentralization of power, but is thus in line with Seierstad and Opsahl (2006). 
Secondly, average board size is in 2000 and 2010 five directors, however the standard 
deviation increases throughout the decade, especially from 2007 and onwards. Firms have 
exited to avoid the legislation, inter alia due to having no or few female directors (Bøhren 
and Staubo, 2012; 2014). 
Thirdly, board of directors becomes on average older by 2010. This development is 
constant throughout the decade, however somewhat more aggressive in the late years. This 
is believed to be a direct consequence of the GBL as male directors are replaced with 
female directors. When looking at gender separately it is interesting to find that 65+ male 
directors seem to hold their directorships regardless of this exogenous shock. The reason 
for this is not addressed in this study. It might be explained by findings from Ahern and 
Dittmar (2010) that directors creating firm value have CEO, DFO or similar experience, and 
are therefore older by default. Ferris et. al. (2003) find that multiple directors usually are 
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older. The female directors are on average significantly younger than male, and contribute 
to the total average age being +/-  50 years. To sum this up, female directors are 
significantly younger (> 5 years) than male directors by 2010. 
Fourthly, firms that have survived as ASA firms throughout 2000 to 2010 have especially 
two characteristics. 1) Survivors tend to have higher centrality measures in the networks 
they are part of and 2) Survivors have not stuck together but are dispersed throughout the 
network.  
Finally, the firm network resembles more a scale free graph than a small world graph, and 
not at all a random graph. Scale free graphs are often referred to as “the rich get richer” or 
“success breeds success”,  indicating that a few firms will have a central position in networks 
and may thrive on being in a favourable position having access to information flows. 
The importance of networks is reported to be of significance when concerned with value 
creation. Bøhren and Strøm (2010) find that firm value increases with multiple 
directorship and strong links to other boards, hence networking. Grønmo and Løyning 
(2003) find that network is considered increasingly important. A word of caution in 
interpreting the meaning and impact of ties is in place, Carpenter and Westphal (2001), 
pinpoint that the number of ties is secondary to the importance or quality of ties. 
Previous literature has expressed concern with GBL leading to less optimal board 
composition, for various reasons. This study shows that even though the network becomes 
sparser over the decade, leaving firms with fewer connections to other firm, the firm 
network structure as a whole has in no way been disrupted. Based on the latter papers and 
this research, there is reason to conclude that the mandatory regulations and code of 
conduct are hardly concerned with potential dependence/independence issues in 
networking. To the extent networks or effects on networks from regulations are 
considered, for example in NCGB, it implies less network with reference to independence. 
Much is still to be studied in terms of network analysis of board structures in Norway, and 
indeed generally. 
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This study has mainly focused on the inter-firm ties created through multiple directorships. 
There is little doubt that inter-firm relations is a significant and important part of the board 
of directorship network. Pursuing the discussion about an elite of people densely 
connected, a study examining directors with high centrality scores in the ASA network 
would probably produce new interesting findings. Another next step could be to include AS 
boards to get a better understanding of how firms interact and are connected. Additionally, 
it would be interesting to analyse a sample of firms with high centrality scores in regard to 
their financial performance. “The rich get richer”, but are they also the once to get rich?  
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APPENDIX 
Appendix 1: Nooy et al (2011) decision tree guide for analysis of cohesive subgroups 
 
 
73 
 
Appendix 2: 20 Top and low female eigenvector scores in the giant component. 
Top 20 Lower 20 
0,2869 1,28E-07 
0,2237 1,28E-07 
0,2233 1,11E-07 
0,1242 1,11E-07 
0,1242 1,11E-07 
0,1020 8,91E-08 
0,0996 8,47E-08 
0,0923 8,47E-08 
0,0690 8,38E-08 
0,0641 8,38E-08 
0,0620 7,57E-08 
0,0620 7,57E-08 
0,0564 4,08E-08 
0,0564 3,54E-08 
0,0564 3,54E-08 
0,0549 2,87E-08 
0,0545 2,19E-08 
0,0520 2,19E-08 
0,0447 1,01E-08 
0,0447 9,58E-10 
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Appendix 3: Firms in Figure 13 
2001 Giant component communety network 
Community Organization no Firm name Vertex no 
1 810090812 Adresseavisen 1 
1 814520242 Namsos Trafikkselskap 6 
1 835925072 Norman 12 
1 879213142 Igroup 30 
1 917103801 Veidekke 81 
1 926022504 Norsk Lotteridrift 95 
1 928661881 Tandberg Data 101 
1 928902749 Håg 103 
1 931693670 Akva Group 118 
1 933174697 Adra Match 120 
1 936796702 Visma 141 
1 945724846 Comuniq 157 
1 960640632 Geo Drilling 182 
1 963795572 Scandinavian Customized Prosthesis 196 
1 964922292 Exense 201 
1 966639199 Cogen 214 
1 968348655 Nettaxess 219 
1 969059401 Tech Partner 222 
1 970601538 Segmentor 223 
1 970997636 Smart Club 224 
1 971506121 Meditron 227 
1 976614089 Probitas 255 
1 976896246 Sport & Spill 267 
1 978644945 First Services 290 
1 978707807 Creditsafe Holding 292 
1 979403909 Buytele 306 
1 980858073 Visma Business 352 
1 981125592 Inmeta 360 
1 981603117 Norsk Lotteridrift 375 
1 981648803 Delphi Smb Ii 379 
1 981910273 Start Network 384 
1 982844576 Visma Services 418 
2 810506482 Den Norske Bank 2 
2 824545022 Eltek 10 
2 876862522 Hansa Borg Bryggerier 28 
2 882076202 Holberg Aktiv Forvaltning 34 
2 910686909 Blom 45 
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2 911772191 Fosen 55 
2 914782007 Vital Forsikring 67 
2 915315577 Raufoss 71 
2 916819927 Torghatten 76 
2 917330557 Widerøes Flyveselskap 82 
2 921482957 Leif Høegh & Co. 90 
2 921526121 Dno 91 
2 921533349 Ivarans Rederi 92 
2 926739166 Odim Hitec 96 
2 928274624 Rica Eiendom 99 
2 930776793 Belships 115 
2 931402900 Det Søndenfjelds-Norske Dampskibsselskab 116 
2 934849930 Nordic Water Supply 130 
2 936270409 Sensonor 137 
2 948633841 Abn Amro Forvaltning 162 
2 963071426 Vensafe 191 
2 965395830 Handicare 206 
2 966770198 Corrocean 215 
2 971590629 Alfred Berg Industrifinans Aktiv Forvaltning 228 
2 974519496 Industrifinans Boligeiendom 233 
2 976683048 Precon 257 
2 976853938 Trico Supply 265 
2 976929284 Cambi 269 
2 977321484 Petrolia 280 
2 979292473 Industrifinans Næringseiendom 301 
2 979297165 Offshore Heavy Transport 302 
2 979734344 Industrifinans Eiendom Baltikum 320 
2 980053865 Se Labels 331 
2 980170225 Mustad Industrier Forvaltning 335 
2 980250547 Itera 337 
2 981122089 Sector Asset Management 358 
2 981165462 Key Asset Management Norge 362 
2 981276957 Dnb Holding 368 
2 982582709 Privatbanken 410 
3 810969652 Fokus Bank 3 
3 816521432 Eksportfinans 8 
3 819731322 Norgesgruppen 9 
3 837041732 Fesil 13 
3 864936792 Bolig- Og Næringskreditt 21 
3 911044110 Christiania Bank Og Kreditkasse 49 
3 911750961 Norske Skogindustrier 53 
3 914778271 Norsk Hydro 66 
3 914864445 Bn Bank 68 
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3 923609016 Statoil 94 
3 927733056 Norgros 98 
3 933739384 Schibsted 124 
3 933783405 Medinor 125 
3 935007356 Ncl Holding 131 
3 937237502 Axis-Shield 143 
3 941735169 Toten Økonomiservice 151 
3 942593821 Kongsberg Automotive 152 
3 957558208 Luxo 175 
3 959033560 Biotec 178 
3 965336796 Norsk Medisinaldepot 203 
3 966991887 Promeks 216 
3 971647949 Cermaq 230 
3 979165285 Byggma 296 
3 979446276 Kebony 309 
3 979561296 Terra Fonds 313 
3 979661274 Consorte Group 318 
3 981400216 Laycan 370 
3 981413156 Dyno Nobel 371 
3 982246822 Dyno Nobel Holding 392 
3 982579201 Terra Aktiv Forvaltning 409 
4 811176702 Sas Norge 4 
4 837457122 Stepstone 15 
4 910102532 Aker Rgi Holding 41 
4 911382008 Elkem 51 
4 912230252 Hafslund 57 
4 912359999 Helly Hansen 58 
4 913661346 Kverneland 61 
4 915470572 Romsdals Fellesbank 72 
4 918883908 Aker Kværner 84 
4 929449991 Simrad Optronics 105 
4 933478963 Technor 122 
4 936647774 Avantor 140 
4 944536949 Nera 156 
4 959942013 Aker Maritime 179 
4 975860078 Pol Nordic Group 237 
4 975898679 Aker Geo 238 
4 976553209 Mefjorden 248 
4 977466482 Helly Hansen Holding 284 
4 979751621 Havila Supply 321 
4 981445449 Farmersfield 373 
4 982281024 Bravida 395 
4 982463718 Telenor 407 
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5 812206222 Gyldendal 5 
5 875778722 Synnøve Finden 27 
5 910261525 Arendals Fossekompani 42 
5 910517694 Bergesen D.Y. 44 
5 910763644 Braathens 47 
5 911752271 Fondsfinans 54 
5 938702675 Af Gruppen 146 
5 939595449 System Sikkerhet 147 
5 976574958 Powel 252 
5 981635647 Fondsfinans Kapitalforvaltning 376 
5 982796598 Fondsfinans Aktiv Forvaltning 415 
6 815832272 Oslo Reinsurance Company 7 
6 868234202 Amfi Eiendom 23 
6 881933632 Rema Eiendom Vest 33 
6 912423921 Hardanger Sunnhordlandske Dampskipsselskap 59 
6 914904633 Hurtigruten 69 
6 915293999 Revheim Eiendom 70 
6 916882173 Troms Fylkes Dampskibsselskap 77 
6 920407048 Allianse 87 
6 920639674 Aktieselskabet Borgestad 88 
6 920775543 Eye-Share 89 
6 929897404 Solvang 107 
6 935738709 Oceanor - Oceanographic Company Of Norway 133 
6 937905645 Gresvig 144 
6 940376645 Ecuanor 149 
6 943753709 Kongsberg Gruppen 155 
6 958839014 Hydralift 177 
6 960756932 Domstein 184 
6 962073182 Steen & Strøm 188 
6 976769643 Ocean Rig 262 
6 976931335 Data Design System 270 
6 977356059 Prosafe 281 
6 980344215 Viking Fotball 339 
6 980667081 Bærum Lufthavn 345 
6 981645685 Rema Eiendom Øst 377 
6 981889355 Allianse Provider 383 
6 982292646 Rema Eiendom Sør 399 
6 982813085 Nor Cargo 416 
6 983238769 Sinvest 423 
6 983298664 Enwa 426 
6 983298702 Oceanor Holding 427 
6 984016522 Nord Norges Dampskipsselskap 440 
7 830357432 Bonheur 11 
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7 910411616 Eidsiva Rederi 43 
7 930357618 Ganger Rolf 111 
7 947224700 Scanbio 160 
7 954676072 Loki 171 
7 976559975 Genomar 249 
7 976841220 Fjord Seafood 263 
7 977388287 Fred Olsen Energy 283 
7 978650449 Axiti 291 
7 979179278 Sikon Øst 297 
7 984037740 Scanbio Holding 441 
8 837088852 Otrum Electronics | Otrum 14 
8 881173662 Pop Media 32 
8 929621417 Bizylink 106 
8 930728209 Awilco 114 
8 934382404 Edb Business Partner 129 
8 936304818 Gjensidige Nor Equities 139 
8 945757647 Fearnley Fonds 158 
8 950766441 Ceetron 164 
8 956753104 Superoffice 174 
8 960545397 Aktiv Kapital 181 
8 965522441 Cicero Forlag 207 
8 965646019 Component Software Group 208 
8 966033967 Bionor Pharma 212 
8 974392453 Vålerenga Fotball 232 
8 976388348 Omnitree Norge 246 
8 976562879 Computerhouse 250 
8 976683420 Infocus 258 
8 976910907 Tordenskjold 268 
8 977483883 Team Shipping 285 
8 979416830 Euro Fleet 307 
8 979441002 Norse Energy Corp. 308 
8 979498748 Wireless Reading Systems 312 
8 980067645 Voss Of Norway 332 
8 980740358 Gjensidige Nor Kapital- Forvaltning 347 
8 981046846 Dropzone 354 
8 981052722 Intellinet 355 
8 981230566 Helpinhand 364 
8 982003008 Pointbreaker 388 
8 982578337 Office Line 408 
9 838583512 Pareto Private Equity 16 
9 956632374 Pareto Securities 173 
9 977287677 Pareto Forvaltning 278 
9 978643825 Garde Aktiv Forvaltning 289 
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9 979203527 Pluss Aktiv Forvaltning 299 
9 983268617 Oslo Børs Holding 424 
9 983268633 Oslo Børs 425 
10 851567372 Norsk Kjøkkeninvest 17 
10 882420302 Officeshop Holding 36 
10 911178664 Det Stavangerske Dampskibsselskab 50 
10 915693016 Winder 73 
10 917019215 Unitor 80 
10 942674465 Jøtul 153 
10 948446103 Evercom Network 161 
10 964976430 Ekornes 202 
10 965662952 Nasdaq Omx Oslo 210 
10 971592311 Scanwafer 229 
10 976605713 Kitron 254 
10 977241774 I M Skaugen 274 
10 979498667 Whitecliff 311 
10 979967837 Euronordic Kapitalforvaltning 327 
10 980758214 Cognition Ventures 349 
10 981646398 Benefit Network 378 
10 981999460 Imarex 387 
10 982232015 Broadband Mobile 391 
10 983670032 Sagatex Holding 434 
10 983670067 Dale Of Norway Holding 435 
11 851634142 Crystal Production 18 
11 910747711 Orkla 46 
11 910985949 Båtservice Holding 48 
11 912007782 Glamox 56 
11 914348803 Moelven Industrier 62 
11 914769922 Goodtech 65 
11 920165931 Kristiansand Dyrepark 85 
11 927124238 Tomra Systems 97 
11 928613941 Scana Industrier 100 
11 928661970 Tandberg 102 
11 936046967 Lister 136 
11 940352738 Tusenfryd 148 
11 943545634 Omnia 154 
11 953114828 Smedvig 168 
11 954046451 Pride 170 
11 962989659 Roxar 190 
11 964266980 S Gruppen 198 
11 965650776 Ideas 209 
11 967598593 Photocure 218 
11 968591878 Klean 220 
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11 974529459 Opera Software 234 
11 975259307 Natumin Pharma 236 
11 976145178 Safetel 239 
11 976568133 Airworks 251 
11 976584201 Network Electronics 253 
11 976855396 Industrifinans Smb Ii 266 
11 977234913 Tandberg Television 273 
11 977250544 Organic Power 277 
11 977385733 Lillestrøm Fotball 282 
11 977499372 Norshell 286 
11 979111576 Fredrikstad Fotballklubb Sport 293 
11 979199325 Navion 298 
11 979364857 Interconsult 304 
11 979650116 Industrifinans Smb Iii 317 
11 980213250 Komplett 336 
11 980413993 Infovital 341 
11 981232585 Storebrand International Private Equity 365 
11 981363876 Statoil Kapitalforvaltning 369 
11 982279143 Coastshell 394 
11 982822645 Storebrand International Private Equity Ii 417 
12 855721902 
Ementor Financial Systems | Tietoenator Financial 
Solutions 19 
12 882332772 Telenor Kapitalforvaltning 35 
12 920237126 Atea 86 
12 930150363 Ementor 109 
12 935891949 Software Innovation 134 
12 950293225 Aker Biomarine 163 
12 951337242 Eterra 165 
12 960102215 Polydisplay 180 
12 962951155 Western Bulk Shipping 189 
12 965361413 Netcom 204 
12 965390049 Caretaker 205 
12 967372668 Hands 217 
12 971125756 Data Respons 226 
12 974341840 Sospita 231 
12 976358465 Customax 245 
12 977301939 Nordic Restaurant Group 279 
12 977511542 Novatech 287 
12 979605501 Nethouse 314 
12 979620292 Neomed Innovation 315 
12 979812345 Start-Fondet 322 
12 980747026 Western Bulk 348 
12 981260147 Nordika Asset Management 366 
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12 982376084 Telenor Venture Ii 402 
12 983640753 Ementor 433 
13 858905192 Wicom | Ignis 20 
13 930256331 Industriinvestor 110 
13 963498586 Robia 194 
13 964843503 Innovation 200 
13 980832562 Adaptive Media 350 
13 980913120 Axxessit 353 
13 981482581 Reiten & Co 374 
13 982769221 Cappit 414 
13 982893496 Konftel Invest 419 
13 983835783 Reiten & Co Asset Management 438 
14 866918112 Formuesforvaltning Drammen 22 
14 958143087 Formuesforvaltning Rådgivende Økonomer 176 
14 962040659 Formuesforvaltning Hurum Og Follo 187 
14 963733690 Formuesforvaltning Oppland Og Hedmark 195 
14 976320034 Formuesforvaltning Oseberg 244 
14 982168716 Akershus Formuesforvaltning 390 
14 982431239 Formuesforvaltning Asker Og Bærum 405 
14 982763118 Formuesforvaltning Oslo 412 
15 871004862 Investra 24 
15 871093482 Opticom 25 
15 883077172 Serve 37 
15 883886852 Carnegie Fondsforsikring 40 
15 917991014 Choice Hotels Scandinavia 83 
15 933921875 A. Sundvall 126 
15 963299850 Guard Systems 192 
15 963342624 Norsk Tillitsmann 193 
15 976307879 Carnegie Forvaltning 243 
15 976846923 Idex 264 
15 979115350 Fastweb 294 
15 979158831 Fast Search & Transfer 295 
15 979356560 Mørdre Sportsnett 303 
15 979694407 Aon Grieg Investor 319 
15 981142977 Smartcall 361 
15 981201825 Thin Film Electronics 363 
15 982250625 Concept Esolutions 393 
15 982410614 Home Invest 404 
15 982769043 Rosa Media 413 
15 983052754 Fastweb 421 
15 983336027 Bluewater Insurance 428 
15 983789579 Rosaindex 436 
15 983789595 Vanadis Internett 437 
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16 871579792 Banqsoft 26 
16 912685144 Hjellegjerde 60 
16 922493626 Green Reefers 93 
16 929975200 Austevoll Havfiske 108 
16 935349230 Dof 132 
16 935956560 Actinor Shipping 135 
16 941576184 Vmetro 150 
16 945883294 Solstad Offshore 159 
16 964118191 Marine Harvest 197 
16 966011726 Nordic Semiconductor 211 
16 976695372 Tgs Nopec Geophysical Company 260 
16 977246156 Odra Industries 275 
16 979403194 Pacpro Norge 305 
16 979881703 Profdoc 326 
16 980489876 Ulstein Group 342 
16 982321514 Pan Pelagic 400 
17 877241602 Frontier Drilling 29 
17 911382296 Elkjøp 52 
17 916979436 Thrane Gruppen 79 
17 929118200 Bjørge 104 
17 930501778 Marine Farms 112 
17 932142104 Tts Group 119 
17 936947220 Orkla Finans 142 
17 938318999 Enskilda Securities 145 
17 951863750 Applied Plasma Physics 166 
17 952751190 Norsk Vekst 167 
17 955706137 Efd - Elva Fritz Dusseldorf 172 
17 971005564 H&Q Norden Corporate 225 
17 976160630 Bryggen Finans Fonds 240 
17 976685881 X.Hlp Technologies 259 
17 976721454 Enitel 261 
17 977037093 Birdstep Technology 271 
17 977097878 Advanced News Networking Systems 272 
17 980408361 Golfaxess 340 
17 980684342 Sense Communications International 346 
17 980855376 Factor Insurance Group 351 
17 981123190 Egroup 359 
17 981263790 Orkla Finans Kapitalforvaltning 367 
17 981928180 Fondsnett 385 
17 981956087 Multibrand 386 
17 982321522 Pan Marine 401 
17 982377528 Norsk Vekst Forvaltning 403 
17 983466133 H&Q Norden Fondsmeglerforretning 430 
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17 983466141 Norden Corporate 431 
17 983521592 Bankia Bank 432 
18 880109162 Dnb Asset Management 31 
18 914526647 Narvesen 63 
18 930673730 Reitan Medinvest 113 
18 933485447 Sponsor Service 123 
18 936301436 Epocket Solutions 138 
18 964620970 Procorp 199 
18 976205308 Eiendomsnett Norge 242 
18 977572266 Norgesinvestor Verdi 288 
18 980050491 Easy Park 330 
18 980159833 Ppn 334 
18 980300609 Allegro Finans 338 
18 980645487 First Securities 344 
18 981695461 Norgesinvestor Verdi Ii 380 
18 981875605 Haavi Lie-Nielsen Rønnov Asset Management 382 
18 982152313 Inaq Invest 389 
18 982431352 Sparebank 1 Aktiv Forvaltning 406 
18 982699355 Sparebank 1 Nord-Norge Forvaltning 411 
18 983054560 Sr-Forvaltning 422 
18 983992765 Universal Fonds Oslo 439 
19 883603362 Abg Sundal Collier Norge 38 
19 883742192 Apptix 39 
19 916235291 Petroleum Geo-Services 74 
19 934254813 Kenor 128 
19 961095026 Abg Sundal Collier 185 
19 961301238 Marineprovider 186 
19 969031140 Eitzen Maritime Services 221 
19 976518373 Norlandia Holding 247 
19 977249287 Telecomputing 276 
19 979626878 Acta Asset Management 316 
19 979867654 Acta Holding 323 
19 979871376 Sundal Collier & Co 324 
19 979871384 Acta 325 
19 980050211 Sundal Collier Institusjonell Forvaltning 329 
19 980095614 Sundal Collier Fondsforvaltning 333 
19 982286891 Acta Bank 396 
19 982286913 Acta Online 397 
19 982288223 Acta Fondsforsikring 398 
19 983354378 Lysaker Maritime 429 
20 914709628 Rieber & Søn 64 
20 916300484 Storebrand 75 
20 933321118 Finansbanken Aktiv Invest 121 
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20 934021592 Farstad Shipping 127 
20 953299216 Finansbanken 169 
20 960755316 Storebrand Kapitalforvaltning 183 
20 966458429 Finansbanken Index 213 
20 976645146 Delphi Aktiv Forvaltning 256 
20 979287534 Norex Group Norway Petroleum 300 
20 979490097 Delphi Investor Service 310 
20 979980876 Continuum Resources International As 328 
20 980585522 Global Geo Services 343 
20 981119487 Norsk Oppgjørssentral 356 
20 981119509 Nos 357 
20 981708504 Xeron 381 
20 982948010 Kaupthing Markets 420 
21 916950381 Andvord Tybring-Gjedde 78 
21 931456237 S-U Soft 117 
21 974986140 Hugin 235 
21 976201590 Folin 241 
21 981435729 Su Intersoft 372 
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Appendix 4: Firms in figure 14 
2010 Giant component communety network 
Community Organization no Firm name Vertex no 
1 812206222 Gyldendal 1 
1 863769132 Markedskraft 8 
1 864234232 Norway Royal Salmon 9 
1 891797702 North Energy 17 
1 910261525 Arendals Fossekompani 19 
1 911752271 Fondsfinans 25 
1 912007782 Glamox 26 
1 914778271 Norsk Hydro 30 
1 916235291 Petroleum Geo-Services 34 
1 936656013 Medistim 56 
1 938803595 Cecon 58 
1 943753709 Kongsberg Gruppen 62 
1 955514262 R.S. Platou 68 
1 964976430 Ekornes 80 
1 981635647 Fondsfinans Kapitalforvaltning 112 
1 982463718 Telenor 115 
1 988228397 Aker American Shipping 145 
1 988843016 Arrow Seismic 155 
1 989961225 Nortechs Fpso 173 
1 990031479 A-Com Norge 175 
1 990874050 Zoncolan 183 
1 991697918 Rainpower 192 
1 995216604 Wilh. Wilhelmsen 203 
1 995277905 Wilh. Wilhelmsen Holding 204 
2 816521432 Eksportfinans 2 
2 824545022 Eltek 4 
2 911750961 Norske Skogindustrier 24 
2 917103801 Veidekke 36 
2 920639674 Aktieselskabet Borgestad 37 
2 928613941 Scana Industrier 42 
2 934021592 Farstad Shipping 50 
2 934382404 Edb Business Partner 51 
2 974529459 Opera Software 90 
2 983268617 Oslo Børs Holding 119 
2 983268633 Oslo Børs 120 
2 983892876 Faktor Eiendom 122 
2 985140421 Verdipapirsentralen 130 
2 986922113 Ability Group 140 
2 988603228 Storebrand Institusjonell Investor 149 
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2 988603252 Storebrand Privat Investor 150 
2 988737798 Block Watne Gruppen 154 
2 989183001 Storebrand Optimã‰R 160 
2 989275089 Dnb Nor Eiendomsinvest I 161 
2 990216924 Oslo Clearing 176 
2 990530297 Fornebu Utvikling 180 
2 991853545 Storebrand Infrastruktur 194 
2 992516178 Borgestad Industries 197 
2 994901281 Union Eiendomsinvest Norge 201 
2 995216531 Bridge Energy 202 
2 995568217 Gjensidige Forsikring 207 
3 819731322 Norgesgruppen 3 
3 858905192 Wicom | Ignis 7 
3 886581432 Aker 13 
3 895465232 Morpol 18 
3 921526121 Dno 38 
3 923609016 Statoil 40 
3 931693670 Akva Group 48 
3 937917376 Nussir 57 
3 938992185 Hexagon Composites 59 
3 950293225 Aker Biomarine 66 
3 960514718 Salmar 70 
3 960545397 Aktiv Kapital 71 
3 961360560 Sølvtrans Holding 74 
3 964118191 Marine Harvest 79 
3 977321484 Petrolia 96 
3 980489876 Ulstein Group 108 
3 984487819 Reservoir Exploration Technology 126 
3 985573913 Via Travel Group 133 
3 986221530 Aker Asset Management 134 
3 986392858 Aker Seafoods 136 
3 986529551 Aker Kværner 137 
3 987727713 Petromena 141 
3 989061879 Aker Contracting Fp 156 
3 989284339 Rem Offshore 162 
3 989628615 Aker Floating Production 165 
3 989795848 Aker Exploration 170 
3 991125175 Arctic Securities 188 
3 991851526 Aker Philadelphia Shipyard 193 
3 992614145 Polaris Media 198 
4 830357432 Bonheur 5 
4 930357618 Ganger Rolf 45 
4 930366323 Fred. Olsen Production 46 
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4 977388287 Fred Olsen Energy 97 
5 845278822 Altinex 6 
5 882757692 Wilson 10 
5 914709628 Rieber & Søn 29 
5 922493626 Green Reefers 39 
5 936310974 Carnegie 55 
5 945757647 Fearnley Fonds 63 
5 945883294 Solstad Offshore 64 
5 963191383 Read 76 
5 963299850 Guard Systems 77 
5 965920358 Norwegian Air Shuttle 81 
5 971647949 Cermaq 87 
5 979446276 Kebony 101 
5 980585522 Global Geo Services 109 
5 983218180 Sevan Marine 118 
5 986558926 Scanarc 138 
5 987989297 Norwegian Energy Company 143 
5 988257133 Bank2 147 
5 989776002 Mpu Offshore Lift 169 
5 989910272 Sevan Drilling 172 
5 991097481 Fearnley Finans Eiendom 187 
5 991281924 Norwegian Finans Holding 190 
6 883603362 Abg Sundal Collier Norge 11 
6 886582412 Aqua Bio Technology 14 
6 910301268 Asker Og Bærums Budstikke 20 
6 930501778 Marine Farms 47 
6 935590221 Bb Finans 54 
6 942593821 Kongsberg Automotive 61 
6 959033560 Biotec 69 
6 961095026 Abg Sundal Collier 73 
6 962007465 Independent Oil & Resources 75 
6 966033967 Bionor Pharma 83 
6 979380593 Algeta 99 
6 979938799 Diagenic 105 
6 983733506 Clavis Pharma 121 
6 984186614 Codfarmers 123 
6 985012059 Navamedic 129 
6 990357242 Probio 178 
6 992470763 Spectrum 196 
7 883742192 Apptix 12 
7 910411616 Eidsiva Rederi 21 
7 912423921 Hardanger Sunnhordlandske Dampskipsselskap 28 
7 966011726 Nordic Semiconductor 82 
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7 972417513 Mamut 88 
7 976695372 Tgs Nopec Geophysical Company 93 
7 977258561 Renewable Energy Corporation 94 
7 979683103 Rosenlund 103 
7 979867654 Acta Holding 104 
7 982769221 Cappit 116 
7 985279721 Protector Forsikring 132 
7 986228608 Yara International 135 
7 989734229 Maracc - Marine Accurate Well 166 
7 990295697 Comrod Communication 177 
7 990727007 Storm Real Estate 182 
7 990919321 Nordic Heavy Lift 185 
7 994035975 Arena Group 199 
8 888571302 Contract Co Alfa 15 
8 982000564 Aker Drilling 114 
8 988571326 Contract Co Beta 148 
9 890687792 Aberdeen Eiendomsfond Asia 16 
9 912230252 Hafslund 27 
9 916300484 Storebrand 35 
9 953299216 Finansbanken 67 
9 963342624 Norsk Tillitsmann 78 
9 988664839 Höegh Capital Management 152 
9 988671258 Aberdeen Eiendomsfond Norge Ii 153 
9 989180797 Aberdeen Asset Management Corporate 159 
9 989761390 Aberdeen Eiendomsfond Norden/Baltikum 167 
9 995532921 Statoil Fuel & Retail 206 
10 910686909 Blom 22 
10 935487242 Q-Free 53 
10 940376645 Ecuanor 60 
10 971125756 Data Respons 86 
10 976094875 Crew Minerals 92 
10 979543883 Dips 102 
10 980250547 Itera 107 
10 984277016 Hafslund Infratek 125 
10 986759808 Norman 139 
10 989112007 Fara 158 
10 989623362 Gjensidige Investeringsrådgivning 164 
10 990565791 Copeinca 181 
10 990906475 Pareto Bank 184 
10 995359774 Saga Tankers 205 
11 910747711 Orkla 23 
11 927124238 Tomra Systems 41 
11 967598593 Photocure 84 
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11 980213250 Komplett 106 
11 988622036 Norwegian Property 151 
11 990947619 Global Rig Company 186 
11 992090480 Dnb Nor Privat Shippinginvestor I 195 
12 914782007 Vital Forsikring 31 
12 928661881 Tandberg Data 43 
12 932142104 Tts Group 49 
12 974442167 Bouvet 89 
12 977473799 Car 98 
12 979441002 Norse Energy Corp. 100 
12 981276957 Dnb Holding 111 
12 984195486 Electromagnetic Geoservices 124 
12 984851006 Dnb Nor Bank 127 
12 984861060 Dolphin Group 128 
12 985206732 Client Computing Europe 131 
12 989307606 Aladdin Oil & Gas Company 163 
12 994051067 Panoro Energy 200 
13 914864445 Bn Bank 32 
13 914904633 Hurtigruten 33 
13 969031140 Eitzen Maritime Services 85 
13 977311632 Camillo Eitzen & Co 95 
13 981119487 Norsk Oppgjørssentral 110 
13 981999460 Imarex 113 
13 982985110 Fish Pool 117 
13 988217867 Concedo 144 
13 988247006 Interoil Exploration And Production 146 
13 989816128 International Maritime Exchange 171 
13 989990500 Eitzen Chemical 174 
13 991674446 Netconnect 191 
14 929975200 Austevoll Havfiske 44 
14 935349230 Dof 52 
14 946598038 Grieg Seafood 65 
14 960756932 Domstein 72 
14 975350940 Lerøy Seafood Group 91 
14 987974532 Gc Rieber Shipping 142 
14 989094823 Norway Pelagic 157 
14 989761846 Ability Drilling 168 
14 990512663 Dof Installer 179 
14 991279539 Bergen Group 189 
14 995632233 Armada Seismic 208 
 
